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EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE 
REGULATION: TIME TO START OVER
Paul G. Mahoney*
ABSTRACT
Over the past half century, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)’s regulations have become key determinants of the way in which stocks 
trade and the fees that exchanges charge for their services. The current equity 
market structure rules are contained primarily in the SEC’s Regulation NMS.
The theory behind Regulation NMS is that a system of dispersed markets 
operating pursuant to SEC-mandated information and order routing links will 
provide the benefits of consolidation and competition simultaneously.
This article argues that Regulation NMS has failed in that quest. It has 
produced fragmented markets and created questionable incentives for market 
participants, possibly producing socially excessive investments in trading 
speed and secrecy. It also discourages exchange innovation, provides 
insufficient incentives for traders to price orders aggressively, requires 
brokers to act against their customers’ interests, and forces the SEC to act as a 
price regulator.
The article contends that the SEC should replace Regulation NMS with 
three simple design principles—issuer choice, exchange autonomy, and
regulatory consistency. These would allow market forces, rather than 
regulatory mandates, to determine the design and pricing of trading platforms 
and the trading strategies of broker-dealers. They would better align the 
private incentives of trading platforms with the social objectives of improving 
liquidity and price discovery.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A typical large-company stock may trade simultaneously on more than a 
dozen regulated exchanges, on electronic markets regulated as broker-dealers, 
and through dealers transacting outside the organized markets.1 This fragment-
ed structure arose in part because technology enabled investors and intermediar-
ies to design new solutions to traditional trading challenges.2 It also arose in 
part because Congress and the SEC made regulatory choices that encouraged 
the proliferation of trading markets and the resulting fragmentation of trading.3
These choices were not the result of a comprehensive design process. Reg-
ulators responded to problems and ideas as they arose. The regulatory evolution 
culminated with the SEC’s adoption of Regulation NMS in 2005.4 Regulation 
NMS and related market structure rules embody three design principles. First, 
1. See Ryan J. Davies & Erik R. Sirri, The Economics of Trading Markets, in SECURITIES 
MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 145, 154 (Merritt B. Fox et al. eds., 2018).
2. See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st 
Century, 1 Q. J. FIN. 1, 2–3 (2011) (“[I]nvestor demands for better solutions to the trading problems 
that they have traditionally faced—and will always face—largely drove the innovations.”).
3. See, e.g., Daniel Gallagher, How to Reform Equity Market Structure: Eliminate “Reg 
NMS” and Build Venture Exchanges, HERITAGE FOUND. (2017), https://www.heritage.org/article
/how-reform-equity-market-structure-eliminate-reg-nms-and-build-venture-exchanges (“[I]n recent 
years, changes to the structure of these markets have been driven as much, if not more, by legisla-
tive and regulatory action than by the private sector . . . .”); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & 
Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 199–200 
(2015); infra Part III.
4. See infra Part II.C.
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exchanges must facilitate brokers’ search for the best price by providing its “top 
of book,” or best-priced quotations, to a central processor that sells data at a col-
lectively determined price subject to SEC regulation.  Second, trading centers 
may not execute a trade at a price inferior to the best price displayed by the cen-
tral processor. Third, any exchange may trade any public company stock.
The underlying logic of this design is that a system of separate but linked 
markets should provide the best of all worlds. Consolidating trading on a single 
market may improve liquidity and price discovery but facilitate monopoly pric-
ing for access to quotations or trade execution. Fragmenting trading among 
competing markets reduces pricing power, but possibly at the expense of liquid-
ity and price discovery. The SEC believed that its separate-but-linked markets 
paradigm would avoid these tradeoffs.5
In this article, I argue that experience has not borne out the logic. Although 
exchanges proliferated following the adoption of Regulation NMS, the resulting 
structure is less competitive and less innovative than the sheer number of ven-
ues might suggest. All thirteen exchanges use the same market design.6 The 
proliferation of exchanges encourages investments in speed and secrecy that 
may be excessive from a societal perspective. It also dulls traders’ incentives to 
bid aggressively against one another rather than free riding on others’ price in-
formation. Regulation NMS requires brokers to sometimes act against their 
customers’ best interests. It has put the SEC in the position of a price regulator, 
a task to which it is not well-suited.
The Treasury Department and the SEC’s Chair and Director of the Division 
of Trading and Markets have suggested various incremental revisions to Regu-
lation NMS to address some of these concerns.7 In October 2019, the SEC is-
sued a public statement inviting exchanges to propose improvements in market 
structure for thinly-traded companies, which could include exemptive relief 
from Regulation NMS and from unlisted trading.8 In early 2020, it proposed 
that the exchanges revise the governance of the Equity Data Plans through 
which the exchanges comply with their regulatory obligation to provide price 
5. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,499 
(June 29, 2005) (noting that the SEC’s objective is to further “the distinct, but equally vital, benefits 
associated with both competition among markets and competition among orders”).
6. See Eric Budish, Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition 
and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market? 1, 4 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ. Uni. of Chi., 
Working Paper No. 2019-72, 2020).
7. See Press Release, Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, & Craig S. Phillips, Couns. to the Sec’y, 
Dep’t of the Treasury, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: Capital Markets 
(Oct. 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-
Capital-Markets-FINAL-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Press Release]; see also Jay Clayton, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Brett Redfearn, Div. of Trading & Mrkts. Dir., U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, Equity Market Structure 2019: Looking Back & Moving Forward, Remarks at 
Fordham University Gabelli School of Business (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/clayton-redfearn-equity-market-structure-2019#_ftn2.
8. See Market Structure Innovation for Thinly Traded Securities, Exchange Act Release 
No. 87,327, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,956, 56,957 (October 24, 2019).
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and quotation data to a consolidated processor.9 More recently, it ordered the 
exchanges to consolidate and revise the governance of the Equity Data Plans.10
These proposals largely deal with the unintended consequences of Regulation 
NMS as it was originally crafted.
This article advocates for a more fundamental rethinking of market structure 
regulation. Regulation NMS should be scrapped and replaced with three alter-
native design principles: issuer choice, exchange autonomy, and regulatory con-
sistency.
Issuers, not exchanges, should decide where their shares trade. There is no 
universally accepted answer to the question of whether welfare is maximized by 
centralizing all trading in a given stock on a single platform or allowing it to 
trade on competing platforms. Public companies should be free to centralize 
trading on a single exchange, spread it over all available platforms, or select 
something in between. Those choices may reveal an optimal structure or show 
that the best structure is a function of issuer characteristics.
Exchanges, not the SEC, should design their trading environments and the 
terms of access to their quotations. Brokers, not exchanges, should be responsi-
ble for processing information and deciding which trading venue offers the best 
available execution. Technology has made it possible to search multiple trading 
platforms in a matter of milliseconds. Brokers’ reputational interest and legal 
obligation to seek the best execution for their customers provide the incentive to 
engage in that search.
The current system for regulating trading platforms distinguishes between 
exchanges, which regulate their member brokers and listed companies, and al-
ternative trading systems (ATS), which do not.  Unlike an exchange, an ATS 
need not display its quotations publicly unless it accounts for more than five 
percent of trading in the relevant stock, which none currently does.11 The dis-
tinction made sense in an era before Congress and the SEC had so thoroughly 
occupied the fields of public company disclosure and governance and broker 
misconduct.12 Given the current regulatory framework for public companies 
9. See Market Data Infrastructure, Exchange Act Release No. 88,216, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,726 
(Mar. 24, 2020); see also Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open 
Meeting on Proposed Order to Modernize the Governance Structure of National Market System 
Plans for Equity Market Data (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
clayton-open-meeting-2020-01-08 (citing “conflicts of interest between the exchanges’ commercial 
objectives, on the one hand, and their regulatory obligations” as part of the motivation for the pro-
posal).
10. See New National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data, 
Exchange Act Release No. 88,827, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,702 (May 13, 2020).
11. See Gabriel Rauterberg, Innovation in the Stock Market and Alternative Trading Sys-
tems, FIN. MRKT. INFRASTRUCTURES: L. & REGUL. (Jens-Hinrich Binder & Paolo Saguato eds., 
forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5–6, 12 n.86) (on file with author) (“[A]ll currently operating 
ATSs include no quotations in the public quotation stream.” (citation omitted)).
12. I have argued that exchanges have strong incentives to regulate listed company disclo-
sure and broker conduct of business in the absence of a government regulator. See generally Paul G. 
Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997). Given the current system, in 
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and brokers, however, the distinction serves no useful purpose and should be 
abolished.
The paper is structured as follows. Part II describes the path by which we 
arrived at the current system of equity market structure regulation, arguing that 
it reflects problems and intellectual trends that are in some cases no longer rele-
vant. Part III discusses ways in which Regulation NMS does and indeed must 
fall short of its goal of providing the benefits of consolidated and competing 
markets. Part IV outlines an alternative set of regulatory principles and de-
scribes first steps the SEC could take to implement them. Part V concludes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE REGULATION
The SEC has long disclaimed a desire to determine the way in which ex-
changes organize trading or the fees they charge for their services.13 In a long 
series of incremental steps, however, it has done both. This Part describes the 
evolution of the SEC’s market structure role, focusing on the specific problems 
and complaints that prompted regulatory action and the intellectual trends that 
shaped it.
A. From the New Deal to the Securities Acts Amendments
The Securities Exchange Act as originally enacted regulated market struc-
ture indirectly through its commands to exchanges to prevent fraud, manipula-
tion, and excessive leverage.14 The exchanges themselves, not the SEC, were 
expected to regulate the business conduct of their member brokers.15 The origi-
nal statute required that exchanges, but not their member broker-dealers, regis-
ter with the SEC.16 By registering, an exchange becomes a self-regulatory or-
ganization (SRO), a term added to the statute in 1975.17 The exchange’s rules 
which the SEC comprehensively regulates both areas, the exchanges’ regulatory role has become a 
relic.
13. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at XXIII (1st Sess. 1971) (“We do not believe, however, that it is either feasible or de-
sirable for the Commission or any other agency of the government to predetermine and require a 
particular structure . . . .”); see also Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Ex-
change Act Release No. 42,208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, 70,619 (Dec. 17, 1999) (in requiring fair and 
reasonable fees, Congress did not intend for SEC to become a ratemaking body).
14. These provisions, as amended, remain in the statute. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g (margin re-
quirements), 78i (prohibition against manipulation), 78j(b) (general antifraud provision) (2018).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2018).
16. The exchange registration requirement, as amended, appears at 15 U.S.C. § 78e. Con-
gress added in 1936 a requirement for brokers and dealers operating in over-the-counter markets to 
register. See Act of May 27, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-621, § 3, 49 Stat. 1377 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78o). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 extended the registration requirement 
to broker-dealers whose business was limited to on-exchange activity. See Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 121.
17. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3(6), 89 Stat. 98 (adding 
new 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26)).
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govern the mechanics of trading, its fees, the conduct of its members, and the 
corporate governance of its listed companies. An SRO must submit proposed 
rule changes for public comment and SEC approval.18
Section 11 of the Act, however, gave the SEC direct influence over some 
aspects of the market structure.19 Subsection (a) authorized it to regulate prin-
cipal trading by exchange members, including specialists.20 Subsection (b) di-
rected it to provide, by rule, that a specialist may trade for its own account only 
to the extent necessary to maintain a fair and orderly market.21 Finally, subsec-
tion (e) directed it to study the feasibility of the “complete segregation of the 
functions of dealer and broker.”22
These provisions stem from the 73rd Congress’s understanding of financial 
markets. Economists would not develop the main building blocks of financial 
economics—portfolio theory, informational efficiency, and asset pricing—until 
decades later.23 While traders of the 1930s could rely on experience and obser-
vation to value assets, Congress relied on a set of sometimes mistaken intuitions 
that we can observe in the legislative history of the Exchange Act.
These intuitions included the belief that dealers who trade for their own ac-
count introduce excess volatility into prices.24 This is because public investors 
were understood to be highly susceptible to chasing price trends.  Legislators 
therefore understood financial professionals’ trading as motivated primarily by 
the desire to ignite momentum and profit from it.25 It followed that principal 
trading by broker-dealers did not serve the interests of ordinary investors.26
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b). Certain rule changes, including those relating to fees, are effective 
upon filing with the SEC. § 78s(b)(3)(A).




23. Key contributions include Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952), 
Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965), and William F. 
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN.
425 (1964), respectively.
24. The importance of active, constant trading can readily be exaggerated. A relatively stable 
market over a period is of much greater importance to investors than a fictitiously stable market that 
involves no more than one eighth of a point spread between sales but results in wide fluctuations 
over days or weeks. See H.R. REP NO. 73-1383, at 14 (1934).
25. See STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND 
CURRENCY, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 29 (1934) (claiming a floor trader’s “policy is to follow the 
trend whether up or down, and his trading greatly accelerates the trend and accentuates market fluc-
tuations.”); see also Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73rd Cong. 124 (1934) (statement of 
Thomas Corcoran) (asserting that floor traders “follow the market the way sea birds follow a ship, 
following the trend . . . .”).
26. Roosevelt’s advisor Thomas Corcoran asserted:
The only interest the public has in a stock exchange is that it should be a place where the out-
side public can buy and sell its stocks. There is no public interest to be served by giving an in-
side seat to a small group of men who are trading for their own account.
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Ultimately, however, Congress did not take it upon itself to design an opti-
mal market structure. An early provision in the bill that became the Exchange
Act, which would have barred stock exchange members from trading for their 
own account, was replaced by Section 11(e), which directed the SEC to consid-
er doing so by rule after conducting a study.27
In the event, the SEC’s Segregation Report under Section 11(e) concluded 
that it was too risky to separate the broker and dealer functions in one legisla-
tive or regulatory step.28 Instead, it took a series of modest steps that included 
barring a specialist from trading for its own account except to the extent neces-
sary to maintain an orderly market, as Section 11(b) of the statute directed.29
The statute also reflected a widespread contemporary belief in the efficacy 
of expert management of complex economic processes.  The early New Deal 
reforms valued regimentation over competition.  This was most visible in the 
National Industrial Recovery Act’s wage and price setting and codes of fair 
conduct.30 The same thinking shaped the securities laws. The Securities Act of 
1933 codified a set of best practices in underwriting, making them mandatory 
for all public offerings.31 The Exchange Act codified the New York Stock Ex-
change’s disclosure requirements, making them mandatory for all exchanges.32
By the time Congress revisited market structure, confidence in the effectiveness 
of expert administration had ebbed.
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 86 (3rd ed. 2003). The Senate’s report 
complained that own-account trades were not identified as such on the ticker tape, with the result 
that “[a] volume of trading which might readily have been considered to reflect a widespread public 
participation . . . represented . . . the activities of members themselves.” STOCK EXCHANGE 
PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 20.
27. See H.R. 7855, 73rd Cong. § 10 (Feb. 10, 1934) (making it unlawful for any member of 
a securities exchange acting as broker to act as a dealer of any security).
28. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF 
THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER at 101–102, 109 (1936) 
[hereinafter SEGREGATION REPORT] (advising an “evolutionary” approach).
29. See id. at 63.
30. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, §§ 3(a), 4(b), 48 Stat. 195, 
196–197 (1933) (“Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial associa-
tions or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or in-
dustry . . . .”). The Supreme Court subsequently invalidated a code of fair competition for the poul-
try industry and in doing so found the NIRA unconstitutional. See generally A.L.A Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
31. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 20–26 (2001) (concluding that the Securities Act made mandatory the practices of the top-
tier investment banks).
32. See PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS 80–
81 (2015) (with Jianping Mei) (“[T]he SEC borrowed heavily from the NYSE’s own disclosure 
rules to create a mandatory disclosure system.”).
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B. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 and the birth of the NMS
Congress’s next significant foray into market structure came with the Secu-
rities Acts Amendments of 1975.33 The statute responded to the paperwork cri-
sis of the late 1960s, in which increased trading volumes overwhelmed the 
NYSE’s paper-based trade reconciliation and settlement systems.34 Large bro-
kerage houses reacted by transitioning to computer-based back-office pro-
cessing. Many smaller firms, along with a few large ones that did not manage 
the transition effectively, either failed or were acquired.35
Noticing that the increased trading volumes reflected the growing participa-
tion of institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension plans, and insurance 
companies in the equity markets, and maintaining a residual fear that trading by 
professional investors is inherently destabilizing, Congress directed the SEC to 
study the influence of institutional investors on the securities markets.36 In 
March 1971, the SEC delivered its 3,000-page report and 2,000 pages of sup-
plemental information, known as the Institutional Investor Study.37
Among other things, the study concluded that institutions struggled to find 
liquidity in sufficient depth for their trading needs.38 While the NYSE special-
ist system was adequate for the needs of retail investors, it was not well-adapted 
for trades of block size. These required a degree of negotiation before exposure 
to the rest of the market.
Accordingly, NYSE members developed the practice of negotiating “up-
stairs,” or off the exchange floor, with institutional investors who desired to buy 
or sell blocks of listed shares. A dealer could agree to take the opposite side of 
the trade at a negotiated price. The deal would then be taken to the specialist, 
who could substitute orders on his book for part of the block trade.39 In this 
way, institutions could negotiate with dealers off the floor without bypassing 
public orders at better prices.
The Institutional Investor Study discussed the block trading market in de-
tail.40 Oddly, it did not consider the effect of the specialist’s negative obligation 
in Section 11(b). An SEC staff interpretation from 1937 held that each individ-
33. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
34. See MARSHALL BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 116–27 (1993).
35. See Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 
1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 232 (2000).
36. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-438, 82 Stat. 453 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78s(e)).
37. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT,
H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64 (1st Sess. 1971).
38. See id. at 95 (“[T]he growing importance of institutional trading has put added strains on 
these markets . . . [because of] the relatively large transactions preferred by institutional investors.”).
39. See Hans R. Stoll, The Stock Exchange Specialist System: An Economic Analysis, in
MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FIN. & ECON. 1, 15 (Salomon Bros. Ctr. for Study Fin. Insts., 1985).
40. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at 1537–828 (1st Sess. 1971).
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ual trade by the specialist must be necessary to maintain a fair and orderly mar-
ket.41 As a consequence, a specialist could not agree to buy a block of shares 
and then gradually sell it into the market—the latter trades would not be “neces-
sary.”
This is not to say that the ordinary trading mechanism at the NYSE could 
easily have accommodated block trades absent Section 11(b) and the staff inter-
pretation. There would have been substantial issues to resolve, including how 
the specialist could assure the best execution of all orders left with him if some 
were non-discretionary orders from retail customers and others were discretion-
ary orders from institutions. A possible solution—giving institutions direct ac-
cess to the specialist post on the same terms as floor traders—would have evad-
ed and possibly destroyed the fixed commission system.
The negative obligation nevertheless sidelined the specialist in the block 
trading process. Block positioners, or dealers who assembled and disposed of 
blocks of shares on behalf of institutional investors, traded on the NYSE, on re-
gional exchanges, and in the “third market,” meaning dealers who were not 
NYSE members but traded listed stocks over the counter. The SEC identified 
the resulting fragmentation of trading in listed securities as a problem to be ad-
dressed.42 The SEC thought a “central market system” that could permit all po-
tential buyers and sellers to interact with one another would better serve inves-
tors.43
The system of fixed commissions on the NYSE, however, posed a barrier to 
a central market. The desire to avoid those commissions led investors to route 
orders to other markets, producing fragmentation. The NYSE attempted to 
counter this through rules that limited its members’ ability to trade listed stocks 
off the exchange.44 The NYSE’s rules had barred members from trading listed 
stocks on regional exchanges until 1941, when the SEC required it to relax the 
rule.45 At the time of the 1975 amendments, NYSE Rule 394 restricted ex-
change members from trading directly with third market dealers.46
Although disavowing an intent to impose a market structure of the SEC’s
devising, the Institutional Investor Study noted with approval that developments 
in communications and data processing made it feasible to link the primary and 
regional exchanges together without merging them into a single entity.47 The 
41. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 1117, 1937 SEC Lexis 357 (Mar. 30, 1937).
42. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at XXIV (1st Sess. 1971) (“[T]here has been no market which was strong enough and 
liquid enough to serve as a major central market.”).
43. See id. (“A major goal and ideal . . . has been the creation of a strong central market sys-
tem . . . in which all buying and selling interest . . . could participate . . . .”).
44. See id. at XXII.
45. See The Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
46. See Note, NYSE Rules and the Antitrust Laws—Rule 394—Necessary Restriction or Ille-
gal Refusal to Deal?, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 812, 828 (1971).
47. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at XXIII (1st Sess. 1971) (“We believe that because of modern communication and data 
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SEC identified exchange restrictions on trading listed stocks off-exchange as a 
significant impediment to such links.
Five months after the SEC published the Institutional Investor Study, the 
NYSE released a report that it had commissioned from the recently retired chair 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and former NYSE 
chair, William McChesney Martin, Jr.48 The Martin Report also recommended 
a form of centralized market. It proposed that each exchange become the exclu-
sive venue for trading its listed stocks. It also, however, proposed to maintain 
fixed commissions and the panoply of incidental rules that kept institutional in-
vestors from obtaining direct access to the market.
This effort to preserve the NYSE’s fixed commission structure doomed the 
Martin Report to condemnation as an anticompetitive rearguard action.49 Ignor-
ing its recommendations, the SEC moved toward a system of separate but 
linked markets and received explicit instruction from Congress to pursue a “na-
tional market system” (NMS) in the 1975 amendments.50
Those amendments added a new emphasis on decentralization and competi-
tion to the Exchange Act. By the mid-1970s, the intellectual pendulum had 
swung away from faith in one size fits all regulation. In 1971, George Stigler 
published The Theory of Economic Regulation, providing a theoretical account 
of the competitive harms that can result from the combined self-interest of regu-
lators and the regulated.51 Politicians from both major parties concluded that 
many regulated industries were insufficiently competitive, to the detriment of 
consumers.52 This intellectual and political shift resulted in the easing of regu-
latory price and entry restrictions, most prominently in the airline, trucking, and 
telecommunications industries.53
The Securities Acts Amendments reflected this change in attitude.  While 
the Exchange Act as originally enacted did not contain a single reference to 
“competition,” the word appears 23 times in the 1975 amendments, including 
the preamble’s declaration of a legislative desire “to remove barriers to compe-
tition” in the Exchange Act.54 Most notably, the statute ordered the SEC to end 
processing facilities it is possible to preserve geographically separated trading markets while at the 
same time tying them together on a national basis.”).
48. See generally WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIES MARKET (1971).
49. See e.g., Donald E. Farrar, The Martin Report: Wall Street’s Proposed “Great Leap 
Backward”, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sep–Oct 1971, at 14, 16 (1971).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (2018) (“The Commission is directed . . . to use its authority . . .
to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities . . . .”).
51. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the indus-
try and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”).
52. See Reuel Schiller, The Ideological Origins of Deregulation, THE REGUL. REV. (Mar. 18, 
2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/18/schiller-ideological-origins-deregulation/.
53. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 1 (1985).
54. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94–29, 89 Stat. 97.
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fixed commissions on the NYSE, a process already underway at the time of en-
actment.55
A second consequential intellectual development was the emergence of a 
theory of market microstructure (although not yet under that name).56 From the 
enactment of the Exchange Act until the mid-1960s, the central policy debate 
was whether market intermediaries exaggerate or retard price trends. The 
SEC’s 1963 Special Study of the Securities Markets analyzed data to determine 
whether specialists and floor traders exercised a “stabilizing” influence by trad-
ing in the opposite direction of price movements, or the reverse.57 In that re-
spect, the Special Study did not represent a conceptual advance from the SEC’s
Segregation Report of 1936, which had similarly focused on whether specialists
and floor traders followed or leaned against price trends.58
In response to the Special Study, Stigler provided a different and novel 
analysis of the role of specialists and floor traders.59 He conceived of investors 
as having individual demand schedules for stocks. Rather than submitting these 
all at once to an auctioneer to determine a market-clearing price, individual in-
vestors submit bids and offers asynchronously and in random sequence to the 
central market. Each order rests there until it either finds a match or expires. In 
this informal model, a liquidity supplier can profit by selling to buyers whose 
bids are above the market-clearing price and vice versa. These liquidity suppli-
ers make investors better off by increasing the probability of transacting and re-
ducing the delay between orders and executions.
The criterion of market efficiency in such a setting is not the stability of 
prices but the cost of transacting as measured by the bid-ask spread.60 Harold 
Demsetz formalized the analysis, modeling the bid-ask spread as the price of 
“immediacy,” or the ability to convert securities to cash or vice versa with min-
imal delay.61 The market microstructure literature developed from this basic 
insight.
The initial focus of that literature was to identify the determinants of the 
bid-ask spread quoted by a given market maker.62 An early paper noted that 
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (2018).
56. As far as I am aware, the term was first used by Mark B. Garman, Market Microstruc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1976).
57. See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 106–110, 213–18 (1st Sess. 1963).
58. See SEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 28, at 19–21, 35–37.
59. See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 124–
33 (1964).
60. Id. at 129 (“In this regime the cost of transactions (half the bid-ask spread plus commis-
sions) will be the complete inverse measure of the efficiency of the markets.”).
61. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35–37 (1968).
62. Id. at 40–55; see also Seha M. Tinic, The Economics of Liquidity Services, 86 Q.J. ECON.
79, 79–80 (1972). See generally Kalman J. Cohen et al., Market Makers and the Market Spread: A 
Review of Recent Literature, 14 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 813, 819 (1979) (noting literature’s
focus on the individual dealer/specialist bid-ask spreads).
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market makers suffer trading losses to investors who possess information not 
yet reflected in prices.63 The market maker must set a spread sufficient to cover 
these adverse selection costs. Economists also identified various factors affect-
ing the market maker’s inventory management costs, including trading volume 
and volatility.64
This emphasis on cost at the level of the individual market maker led schol-
ars to ask whether economies of scale made the position of liquidity provider—
in effect, the exchange specialist—a natural monopoly.65 Later scholars would 
note that this focus was incomplete because it ignored the fact that public inves-
tors who submit limit orders compete with the exchange specialist and floor 
traders to supply liquidity and capture the spread.66 That insight was not yet 
formalized at the time of the 1975 amendments and the SEC’s first steps toward 
implementation.
Commentators accordingly viewed the NYSE’s auction market as inferior 
to Nasdaq’s competitive dealer market. Everything about the NYSE—fixed 
commissions, restrictions on off-exchange trading, the ban on institutional 
membership, the single specialist barred from doing business directly with any-
one other than exchange members—looked monopolistic to critics. Seymour 
Smidt, an economist who served as an associate director of the Institutional In-
vestor Study, and Morris Mendelson, an economist who wrote a detailed blue-
print for a centralized market, both took it as obvious that an optimal market 
would look more like the Nasdaq dealer market than the NYSE auction mar-
ket.67
The SEC was eager to create competition for the NYSE specialist and fo-
cused on intermarket linkages as the means.68 Beginning in 1971, the SEC 
pressured the exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
63. See Walter Bagehot (pseudonym for Jack L. Treynor), The Only Game in Town, 27 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 12, 13 (1971) (“The market maker always loses” to “transactors possessing special 
information”; therefore “his gains from liquidity-motivated transactors must exceed his losses to 
information-motivated transactors.”). The dynamic interaction of information traders and market 
makers was formalized by Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 
ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985).
64. See Tinic, supra note 62, at 80.
65. Compare Demsetz, supra note 61, at 42 (“scale economies with respect to the transac-
tions of a particular trader suggest natural monopoly”), with Seymour Smidt, Which Road to an Ef-
ficient Stock Market: Free Competition or Regulated Monopoly?, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 18, 64 
(1971) (“There is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that [market making] is, in fact, a 
natural monopoly.”).
66. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 814 (“[I]nadequate attention has been given to the fact 
that, via their limit orders, ‘ordinary’ traders also supply immediacy”).
67. See Smidt, supra note 65, at 65–66; see also Morris Mendelson, From Automated 
Quotes to Automated Trading: Restructuring the Stock Market in the U.S. 34–35, N.Y.U.
GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. ADMIN. INST. OF FIN. BULL. NOS. 80–82, at 34–35 (1972).
68. See generally Paul G. Mahoney & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The Regulation of Trading 
Markets, in Merritt B. Fox et al., eds., Securities Market Issues for the 21st Century 221, 234–236 
(Merritt B. Fox et al. eds., 2018).
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(NASD) to create a consolidated tape to report the prices and quantities of all 
transactions in listed securities.69 The SEC also proposed a consolidated quota-
tion system to display publicly the best bids and offers on each exchange and 
from each dealer in listed stocks. The NYSE, which viewed the specialist’s
book as proprietary, strongly resisted the latter project.70
The 1975 amendments, however, removed any doubt about the SEC’s au-
thority to require “linking of all markets . . . through communication and data 
processing facilities.”71 The SEC required the exchanges and the NASD to cre-
ate a consolidated quotation system.72 The market centers were to report last-
sale and quotation data to a “securities information processor” (SIP), which 
would then sell the information to third parties on terms that the Exchange Act 
requires to be “fair and reasonable.”73
The NYSE and American Stock Exchange created a jointly owned SIP to 
disseminate quotations in listed securities and options while Nasdaq registered 
as a SIP for Nasdaq-traded and other over-the-counter securities.74 The relevant 
market centers formed joint committees, or “Plans,” to determine the fees they 
would charge for market data and how to allocate the resulting revenue among 
the participating markets. As a practical matter, then, the trading markets col-
lectively negotiated the price of access to quotations with the professional in-
vestment community.
Finally, at the SEC’s urging, the exchanges and the NASD created order 
routing linkages, known as the Intermarket Trading System (ITS). The ITS was 
first implemented as an experiment but in 1983 gained SEC approval to operate 
indefinitely.75 It consisted of a messaging system through which a broker on 
the floor of one exchange could transmit an order to another participating mar-
ket. In connection with the ITS, the exchanges adopted rules limiting the ability 
of a member broker to initiate a “trade through,” meaning a trade at a price infe-
rior to that displayed by another ITS market.76
The ITS required exchanges to act against their self-interest. An exchange 
desires to execute an order for which it is the initial point of entry. No ex-
change, therefore, had an incentive to maintain the ITS at the leading edge of 
69. See Rule 17a-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-15 (1973) (amended and replaced by Rule 601 of 
Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2020)).
70. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, supra note 13, at 70,620 (de-
scribing history of consolidated quotation system).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(D) (2018).
72. See Display of Transaction Reports, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,369, 12,405–07 (1980) (codified at 
17 C.F.R. 240.11Ac1-2) (amended and replaced by Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. § 
242.602 (2020)).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(1)(C) (2018).
74. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, supra note 13, at 70,616, 
n.18.
75. See Am. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4,938,
4,938–39 (1983).
76. See id. at 4,939.
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information technology.77 Nor did the exchanges have incentives to enforce 
trade-through protections, a task they left to the broker representing an order
that was traded through.78
The SEC’s initial plan had been more disruptive still to existing market 
models. Announcing its desire for an ITS in 1978, the SEC stated that its ulti-
mate goal was to require the exchanges to create a “central limit order file” and 
to recognize time as well as price priority for all public limit orders in the file.79
In that system, a broker would be barred from executing an order outside the 
central file if an order at the same or a better price was available in the file. If
the file contained multiple orders at the best price, the one first in time would be 
first to execute. However, the exchanges strongly opposed the central file on 
the grounds that it would reduce dealers’ incentives to make markets and ulti-
mately displace the exchanges’ trading floors. The SEC backed down.80
A plausible reading of the 1975 amendments is that Congress wanted the 
SEC to sweep aside all of the NYSE’s anti-competitive rules, not just fixed 
commissions, then permit competition to determine the way in which price and 
quotation information would reach brokers and how those brokers would seek 
the best execution for their customers.81 Instead, the SEC chose to centralize 
not just post-trade price and volume data, but also pre-trade quotation data, and
to force exchanges to route trades to their competitors. The SEC apparently 
took the NYSE’s anticompetitive practices as empirical proof that competition 
among traders and trading venues cannot produce efficient market structures 
without direct regulatory intervention. The conclusion was hasty for two rea-
sons.
At the time of the 1975 amendments, the stock exchanges’ role as SROs 
bearing statutory obligations complicated the application of normal antitrust 
principles to anti-competitive exchange policies.82 The Seventh Circuit had re-
77. See Hans R. Stoll, Market Fragmentation, 57 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 16, 16 (2001) (“The ITS
. . . has not kept pace with technology”).
78. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 236.
79. See Development of National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 
Fed. Reg. 4,353, 4,359 (1978).
80. See Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 15,671, 44 
Fed. Reg. 20,360, 20,362 (1979) (“[T]he Commission recognizes the possibility that introduction of 
a system based upon the absolute time priority concept could have a radical and potentially disrup-
tive impact on the trading process . . . . Therefore, industry and Commission efforts should be con-
centrated on the achievement of nation-wide protection for all public limit orders based on the prin-
ciple of price priority.”).
81. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that, under 1975 Amendments, “‘competitive 
forces’ were supposed to drive market development” (citation omitted)); see also Jonathan R. 
Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 
U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 323–24 (1985) (“[T]he proper process seems to be to eliminate the restrictions 
on market participation, then to allow the market to dictate the evolution of the appropriate commu-
nications systems”).
82. See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 360–61 (1963) (although self-regulatory status of 
exchanges does not convey a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws, actions “which fall within 
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cently held that the fixed commission rule was an exercise of the self-regulatory 
function and accordingly outside the scope of the antitrust laws.83 Just weeks 
after the 1975 amendments were enacted, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Exchange Act pre-empted the antitrust laws with respect to stock exchange 
commission rates.84 Absent the statutory scheme that Congress created and the 
SEC administered, the NYSE’s rules would have been subject to antitrust scru-
tiny and the fixed commission rule likely invalidated long before 1975.
Moreover, at the time of the 1975 amendments, it had only recently become 
technologically feasible for electronic order entry, routing, and execution to re-
place face-to-face or telephonic communication. The Institutional Investor 
Study observed that “[u]ntil comparatively recently there were serious techno-
logical limitations on creating a system where all interests of investors could be 
represented in a central market.”85 But it went on to argue that centralizing 
trading on a single market produces “a certain amount of monopoly power, par-
ticularly with respect to the dealer function.”86 The SEC therefore concluded 
that investors and exchanges would not take full advantage of new technologies 
without prodding.
C.  From the 1975 Amendments to Regulation NMS
In the decade after the 1975 amendments, economists gained a more de-
tailed appreciation for the role that limit orders play in a specialist market and 
accordingly came to see the distinction between dealer and auction markets in a 
different light.87 In theory, limit orders provide competition to the specialist, 
meaning that the specialist cannot unilaterally determine the market bid-ask 
spread for a listed stock.88 Empirically, as of the mid-1970s, about 50% of 
traded volume on the NYSE involved a limit order on the specialist’s book, 
compared to about 25% of traded volume in which the specialist took one side 
of the trade as principal.89
Were the Nasdaq dealer market more competitive than the NYSE auction 
market, one would have expected bid-ask spreads to be smaller on Nasdaq for 
the scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as justified” for antitrust 
purposes).
83. See Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 
(1967).
84. See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975).
85. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO.
92-64, at XXIV (1st Sess. 1971).
86. Id.
87. See generally Robert C. Klemkosky & Robert M. Conroy, Competition and the Cost of 
Liquidity to Investors, 37 J. ECON. & BUS. 183, 184 (1985) (distinguishing external competition 
from other dealers and internal competition from limit orders).
88. See Kalman J. Cohen et al., Transaction Costs, Order Placement Strategy, and Existence 
of the Bid-Ask Spread, 89 J. POL. ECON. 287, 297 (1981).
89. See Stoll, supra note 39, at 14–15.
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stocks of similar size and trading volume. However, studies consistently found 
lower average quoted spreads on the NYSE.90 Although there are many possi-
ble explanations, including differential inventory or information costs, the em-
pirical results focused further attention on the role that limit orders play in the 
NYSE auction market.
Public traders who submit limit orders operate at a disadvantage relative to 
NYSE specialists or Nasdaq market makers. Professional dealers intensely 
monitor the market in their assigned stocks and can adjust their quotations rap-
idly and frequently. By contrast, public traders have other demands on their 
time and can adjust their prices only episodically.  Public investors who send 
limit orders to the specialist through their brokers, therefore, write options to the 
rest of the market.91 They do so in the belief that the expected gains from buy-
ing or selling at superior prices exceed the implicit option premium. The rest of 
the market meanwhile benefits from the option in the form of lower average 
spreads.
This insight, in turn, produces a slightly different outlook on the competing 
dealer model. Nasdaq was designed as a pure dealer market. Every customer 
trade was with a market maker at its bid or ask price. In principle, a broker 
could leave a limit order with a market maker, but unlike the NYSE specialist, 
the Nasdaq market maker had no obligation to give it priority over its own quo-
tations or expose it to the rest of the market. Instead, the market maker could 
trade against the order as principal if and when it found it in its interests to do 
so. The bid-ask spread, therefore, was determined by competition among deal-
ers in which public limit orders did not play a material role.
Having concluded that the NYSE auction model was more competitive than 
it appeared at first glance, economists soon concluded that the competing dealer 
model might be less competitive than it appeared – at least as realized on 
Nasdaq in the early 1990s. Although the minimum tick size on Nasdaq was 
one-eighth of a dollar, William Christie and Paul Schultz demonstrated that 
dealers largely avoided quotes at odd eighths.92 Thus the quoted spread for 
many stocks was at least twenty-five cents. The Christie and Schultz paper 
raised the possibility that dealers were colluding to maintain a wider spread.
The SEC responded to the resulting outcry by adopting the so-called “order 
handling rules” in 1996.93 Among other things, the order handling rules re-
quired Nasdaq market makers and exchange specialists to display customer lim-
it orders that improved either the price or size of the dealer’s own quote. After 
90. See Ananth Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MKTS. 205, 231 
(2000).
91. See generally Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask 
Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983).
92. See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid 
Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1838 (1994).
93. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 
48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996). The order handling rules are now codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.604 (2020).
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the rule’s implementation in 1997, the Nasdaq market incorporated auction fea-
tures, just as the ITS introduced competing-quotation features to the auction 
markets. The two models would soon converge.
By the close of the 20th century, the SEC had required the regulated ex-
changes to create a consolidated trade reporting system, a consolidated quota-
tion system, and a set of intermarket communication links enabling an exchange 
receiving an order to route it to one displaying a superior price. There was nev-
ertheless reason to question whether these structural changes had created robust 
competition among venues and market makers.  Two facts in particular stood 
out.
The NYSE remained the dominant market for its listed stocks, accounting 
for roughly 90% of on-exchange trading volume and 80% of total trading vol-
ume in its listed stocks.94 The SEC accordingly pressured the NYSE to elimi-
nate Rule 390, the successor to Rule 394, which continued to limit members’
ability to trade listed securities as principal off the exchange floor. The NYSE 
repealed the rule in 2000.95
Meanwhile, despite a change in the minimum tick size from one-eighth to 
one-sixteenth on Nasdaq, the NYSE’s quoted and realized spreads remained 
smaller than those on Nasdaq.96 Hendrik Bessembinder, who documented the 
fact, attributed it to the widespread practice of “preferencing” Nasdaq order 
flow.97 In a preferencing arrangement, a broker agrees to route orders to a par-
ticular market maker, with the latter agreeing to execute at the best quote even if 
it was not currently displaying the best quote.98 Preferencing weakens market 
makers’ incentives to quote aggressively because they can capture order flow 
without publicly displaying the best price.
These indicia of less-than-perfect competition coexisted with indicia of 
market fragmentation. The order handling rules led to a growing volume of 
trading in Nasdaq stocks through ATSs.99 At that time, ATSs traded primarily 
in Nasdaq stocks, although they began to trade actively in NYSE stocks after 
the repeal of Rule 390. An ATS that chose to display its best quotes publicly, 
known as an “electronic communications network” (ECN), could require that 
Nasdaq incorporate those quotes into the consolidated quotation system.100
94. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 7, at 53 fig.6 (showing the share of on-exchange 
volume); see also Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 18–19 (showing the share of total trading 
volume).
95. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange 
Act Release 42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175, 30,176 (May 10, 2000).
96. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs on Nasdaq and the NYSE: A Post-
Reform Comparison, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 387, 388 (1999).
97. Id. at 389–90.
98. See Paul E. Godek, Why Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes, 41 J. FIN.
ECON. 465, 466–67 (1996).
99. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Rule 390; Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,580 (Feb. 28, 2000).
100. See 17 C.F.R. §242.600(b)(24) (2020) (defining “electronic communications network”).
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Other ATSs, known as “dark pools,” chose not to display quotations.101 Alt-
hough some ATSs initially decided to operate as ECNs, at present all ATS op-
erate as dark pools.102
In addition, brokers route retail orders to dealers who execute the trades 
from their own inventory outside the organized markets, a practice known as 
“internalization.” Because retail customers’ orders are considered safe (that is, 
not informed), dealers are eager to execute them and earn the spread—so much 
so that they pay brokers to route orders to them, a practice known as payment 
for order flow.103
Meanwhile, the market microstructure literature debated the relative merits 
of consolidating order flow onto a single venue versus allowing multiple venues 
to compete with one another.  Lawrence Glosten demonstrated the theoretical 
appeal of a consolidated limit order book (CLOB) open to all traders, displaying 
the price and size of all limit orders, and running an automated continuous auc-
tion.104 An idealized CLOB, he argued, would produce a sufficiently small bid-
ask spread that no exchange or dealer would have an incentive to compete with 
it. Moreover, the CLOB would produce as much liquidity as feasible given the 
existence of an information asymmetry among traders.
The challenge for an open CLOB is practical: how would its services be 
priced? An open CLOB would be in essence a public utility. If the owner could 
not make a profit, no one would have an incentive to build it. On the other 
hand, if the CLOB did indeed centralize all trading, the owner could charge a 
monopoly price for market access and/or data.105 Thus, when a group led by 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley proposed that the SEC re-
quire a CLOB and offered to build and operate it, other industry participants 
shouted down the proposal as anticompetitive.106
Other academics argued in favor of competition among trading venues over 
consolidation on a single venue. Larry Harris noted that the needs of large and 
small traders differ and market fragmentation is one response.107 The develop-
101. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 242–43.
102. See Rauterberg, supra note 11 (manuscript at 6).
103. See Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the Payment for Order Flow Problem, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2001).
104. See generally Lawrence R. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevita-
ble?, 49 J. FIN. 1127 (1994).
105. See Craig Pirrong, Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and the Efficiency 
of Securities Trading, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 386 (2002) (suggesting that, while centralizing 
trading improves welfare under open access, the operator of the central market has an incentive to 
limit access to maximize profit).
106. See Michael Schroeder, Stock-Trading Powerhouses Change Tune on Overhaul, WALL
ST. J. (June 2, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB959892058978104469.
107. See Lawrence E. Harris, Consolidation, Fragmentation, Segmentation, and Regulation, 
in GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS: TECHNOLOGICAL, COMPETITIVE, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES
269, 275–77 (Robert A. Schwartz ed., 1995).
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ing literature on network effects suggested that the loss of consumer surplus 
from monopoly may outweigh network efficiencies.108
Still others contended that efficient market structures could arise from the 
decentralized decisions of market participants without regulatory guidance.
Hans Stoll argued that the ITS was ill-conceived. The SEC need not require ex-
changes to create intermarket linkages so long as brokers seek the best execu-
tion on behalf of their customers and the exchanges publicize their best bids and 
offers.109 Under those conditions, brokers will create their own links to the 
competing markets and use them to route orders to the market offering the best 
price. Unlike exchanges, which do not benefit individually from intermarket 
linkages, brokers would have an incentive to make theirs as quick and effective 
as possible.
Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson proposed a different form of decen-
tralized decision making about market structure.110 They argued that publicly 
traded companies should be able to select the markets in which their securities 
will trade. Because there is a positive association between liquidity and market 
value, issuers have an incentive to select the trading venue(s) that maximize the 
stock’s liquidity and thereby its share price.111 Issuers’ choices could be the 
mechanism driving exchanges to provide efficient trading platforms. Issuers 
might choose to centralize all trading on a single venue, to disperse trading 
among as many platforms as possible, or something in between, depending on 
the liquidity consequences.
The SEC, however, concluded that its preferred system of separate but 
linked markets, with some revisions, could provide the best of both worlds—
competition among market venues and interaction of all customer orders. In 
Regulation NMS, adopted in 2005 and implemented in phases during 2006, it 
addressed what it viewed as the deficiencies in the ITS.
In particular, Regulation NMS replaced existing exchange rules governing 
trade-throughs and market access with SEC-determined rules binding on the ex-
changes. Its “order protection rule” (OPR) requires market centers (including 
Nasdaq and over-the-counter market-makers, which were not previously subject 
to the exchange trade-through rules) to design policies and procedures reasona-
bly designed to prevent trade-throughs of “protected quotations.”112 Only quo-
tations available for automatic and immediate execution are protected.113 Under 
108. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 
683 (1996).
109. See Stoll, supra note 77, at 19.
110. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading 
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1415–16 (1996).
111. On the association between liquidity and market value, see Yakov Amihud and Haim 
Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 246–47 (1986).
112. See Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2020).
113. A “protected quotation” includes a “protected bid or protected offer”, NMS Security 
Designation and Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 600(b)(62) (2020). The latter terms are limited to “auto-
mated quotations.” See id. § 242.600(b)(61)(iii). An “automated quotation” is one displayed by a 
20 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 10:1
the so-called “Access Rule,” trading centers are required to provide nondiscrim-
inatory execution access to those quotations and to charge no more than three-
tenths of a cent per share for such access.114
The OPR and associated rule changes were controversial. Their adoption 
prompted a lengthy dissent by two of the five commissioners, who argued that 
the new regulations would have a “detrimental impact on competition and inno-
vation.”115 They predicted that the OPR would homogenize exchanges and fail 
to encourage traders to display liquidity publicly.116 As I discuss in the next 
section, both predictions were accurate.117
III. DRAWBACKS OF REGULATION NMS
This section discusses the drawbacks of the current structure in detail. Un-
fortunately, the multiplicity of trading venues has not produced innovation in 
trading methods nor competitive pricing for market data.  Instead, innovation 
and competition have come in the form of complex access fee structures and 
investments in communicating ever more rapidly from one venue to another, 
neither of which is clearly socially beneficial.
An obvious counterargument is that the equity markets are functioning quite 
well, particularly for the largest traded companies. There is always a danger 
that changing the system would reduce market quality, a point I address at the 
end of this section.
A.  Regulation NMS and Market Fragmentation
As of July 2020, there are thirteen operating equity exchanges in the United
States. In 2000, by contrast, there were eight. Beginning in 2005, Nasdaq and 
the NYSE acquired the other six of those, but have maintained them as separate 
exchanges, in some cases operating under different access fee and rebate struc-
tures.118 A new family of exchanges, BATS (now owned by CBOE and com-
trading center that “immediately and automatically” executes an incoming market order against that 
quotation. See id. § 242.600(b)(4).
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a) (2020) (nondiscriminatory access); see id. § 242.610(c) (fee 
cap).
115. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,632 (June 
29, 2005) (Comm’rs Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins, dissenting).
116. Id. at 37,640 (“the trade-through rule will restrict competitive forces and reduce markets 
to the lowest common denominator”); see id. at 37,637 (noting that OPR will “provide more incen-
tive to maintain liquidity in reserve, rather than to display it publicly”).
117. See also Gallagher, supra note 3, at 5 (“As Commissioners Atkins and Glassman pre-
dicted in 2005, Reg NMS has exacerbated market fragmentation and complexity while at the same 
time blunting competition and innovation.”).
118. The former American stock exchange now operates as NYSE American. The former 
Cincinnati Stock Exchange, subsequently renamed the National Stock Exchange, now operates as 
NYSE National. The former Chicago Stock Exchange now operates as NYSE Chicago. The former 
Pacific Stock Exchange was acquired by Archipelago Holdings, which now operate as NYSE Arca. 
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prising four separate equity exchanges) was created in 2005. The Investors Ex-
change, or IEX, is a stand-alone exchange that began trading in 2016.  Three 
more equity exchanges are in the process of opening. One will be affiliated 
with an existing family of registered equity options exchanges, the MIAX Ex-
change Group. Two additional stand-alone exchanges, the Long-Term Stock 
Exchange, or LTSE, and the Members Exchange, or MEMX, have obtained 
SEC registration.
As electronic trading has replaced manual trading, the cost of creating a 
trading platform has fallen, making the market for exchanges contestable.119
The cost of obtaining regulatory approval, however, remains substantial.120
Creating a new exchange is also difficult because of a network externality.
Traders want to go where there are already other traders. Liquidity attracts li-
quidity, as the saying goes. Why would anyone connect and pay access and da-
ta fees to a new exchange that operates identically to existing exchanges and 
has, at the outset, minimal trading?
The short answer is that Regulation NMS forces existing exchanges to con-
nect to any newly registered exchange. The SIP must also gather its trade and 
quotation data and share the revenues generated by the consolidated data feeds.
And although the OPR is addressed to trading centers, not brokers, institutional 
brokers argue that they have no practical alternative but to connect (and pay 
fees) to every registered exchange.121 Finally, the major exchange groups have 
an incentive to maintain any acquired exchange as a separate entity rather than 
fold it into an existing exchange. As currently structured, each exchange gets a 
vote in the Equity Data Plans that determine the amount and allocation of data 
fees.122 Regulation NMS is therefore part of the reason for the proliferation of 
exchanges.
The former Boston and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges now operate as Nasdaq BX and Nasdaq 
PHLX, respectively. The latter is an options exchange. Nasdaq also, however, operates a Nasdaq 
PSX equity exchange. The SEC’s web page contains a list of registered exchanges. See Self-
Regulatory Organization Rulemaking, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov
/rules/sro.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
119. See Ian Domowitz & Benn Steil, Automation, Trading Costs, and the Structure of the 
Trading Services Industry, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 33, 33
(Robert Litan and A.M. Sontomero eds., 1999); see also Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trad-
ers and Market Structure, 49 FIN. REV. 333, 334 (2014).
120. See Rauterberg, supra note 11 (manuscript at 19).
121. See Alexander Osipovich & Gunjan Banerji, As Stock Exchanges Multiply, Miami Wants 
In on the Game, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2019, 8:02AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-
exchange-competition-heats-up-as-miax-eyes-launch-11551704521 (“[L]arge brokers and traders
. . . say they are effectively forced by Securities and Exchange Commission rules to connect to each 
exchange”).
122. The SEC has ordered an amendment that will give each exchange family a single vote. 
See Order Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a 
New National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 88,827, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,702, 28,729–30 (May 13, 2020).
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One might argue this is all to the good. More exchanges mean more com-
petition. Unfortunately, the fragmentation of trading has not produced the de-
gree of trading system innovation and reduction in trading costs that the SEC 
expected. It has also increased the demand for high-speed communication be-
tween exchanges. The various SEC proposals mentioned in the Introduction 
and described in more detail below demonstrate that the agency is not entirely 
happy with its creation.
B. Regulation NMS Creates Questionable Incentives for Trading Centers and 
Professional Traders
As U.S. exchanges shifted from manual to electronic order matching, li-
quidity provision shifted from specialists and traditional market makers to high-
frequency trading firms (HFTs).123 Although there is no universally accepted 
definition of HFTs, a working definition might be firms that specialize in enter-
ing and canceling proprietary orders rapidly using automated processes.
HFTs can trade at microsecond speeds through colocation—placing the 
hardware running their trading algorithms in close physical proximity to the 
hardware running the exchanges’ matching engines—and through investing in 
high-speed communications links between trading venues. Exchanges offer, 
and HFTs subscribe to, high-speed proprietary data feeds that both reach traders 
faster than the SIP’s data and include information that the exchanges do not 
provide the SIP.
Stock traders have always been early adopters of new communications 
technologies in the competition to get information first.124 Informed traders 
want to trade before others learn the same information or infer it from the pat-
tern of orders or trades. Liquidity providers face a basic tradeoff between cap-
turing the bid-ask spread and leaving themselves open to adverse selection and 
inventory management risk. The faster they can revise their priced orders in 
response to new information, the less susceptible they will be to these risks. To 
the extent HFTs can minimize risk, they can quote tighter spreads, which bene-
fits liquidity demanders.125 We might think of that as a defensive use of the 
HFTs’ speed advantage.
123. Cf. Vincent van Kervel & Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading around Large 
Institutional Orders, 74 J. FIN. 1091, 1091 (2019) (“Migration to electronic trading created a new 
type of market participant: high-frequency traders (HFTs).”).
124. See Kenneth Garbade & William Silber, Technology, Communication and the Perfor-
mance of Financial Markets: 1840-1975, 33 J. FIN. 819, 823 (1978) (domestic telegraph); see also
id. at 826–27 (transatlantic cable).
125. See Jonathan Brogaard et al., Trading Fast and Slow: Colocation and Liquidity, 28 REV.
FIN. STUD. 3407, 3408–09 (2015) (describing market-maker use of colocation services and resulting 
improvements in effective spreads). See also Katya Malinova, Andreas Park & Ryan Riordan, Do 
Retail Investors Suffer from High Frequency Traders? 4 (Working Paper, 2018) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183806 (finding that Canadian regulatory fee change that reduced HFT 
increased effective spreads for retail traders).
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There is also, however, an offensive use in which HFTs impose adverse se-
lection losses on other traders. For example, when the price of an asset increas-
es on Exchange A, if a given trader can obtain that information and act on it 
more quickly than others, it can trade against quotations for the same asset that 
are now stale (that is, do not reflect the new market conditions) on Exchanges 
B, C, and D. This “latency arbitrage” offers significant profits.126
HFT and latency arbitrage do not just exist in U.S. equity markets. Howev-
er, there is some reason to believe that the U.S. regulatory system encourages 
more than the socially optimal amount of investments in speed. The more ven-
ues there are trading the same assets, the more prizes there are to be won by 
winning races from one to another as quoted prices change. The association be-
tween Regulation NMS and fragmentation, therefore, may also link Regulation 
NMS to excessive investments in speed.
A separate issue arises from Regulation NMS’s definition of “protected 
quotation” to include only quotations disseminated under an NMS Plan or, in 
other words, displayed by the SIP. The SIP exists side by side with proprietary 
data feeds. Information about revised quotations or completed trades may reach 
traders through proprietary feeds faster than through the SIP, offering an arbi-
trage opportunity to the trader that can win the race to a venue displaying a stale 
price.127
Commentators have noted that the SIP displays the same best quotations as 
proprietary feeds “almost all” of the time.128 The relevant question, however, is 
not the duration of arbitrage opportunities, but whether their aggregate magni-
tude is sufficient to encourage more socially wasteful investment in speed at the 
margin. The evidence on this issue is mixed.129
126. See, e.g., Matteo Aquilina, Eric Budish & Peter O’Neill, Quantifying the High-
Frequency “Arms Race”: A Simple New Methodology and Estimates 5 (Becker Friedman Inst. For 
Econ. Univ. Chi., Working Paper No. 2020-86, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636323; Eric Bud-
ish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auc-
tions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1553 (2015). The latter paper shows that 
“sniping” of stale quotes is a problem even when traders are all fast. Because messages to the ex-
changes are processed in the order received, every message to adjust a quote must arrive before any
order to trade at the stale price to prevent sniping. Differential speed tilts the playing field in the fast 
traders’ direction.
127. The SEC’s proposed changes to its market data rules would require SROs to transmit 
data to the competing consolidators using the same means and at the same speed as the proprietary 
feeds. See infra note 175.
128. See PHIL MACKINTOSH & KA WO CHEN, THE NEED FOR SPEED IV: HOW IMPORTANT IS 
THE SIP? KCG TRADING STRATEGIES & MARKET ANALYTICS 1 (2016).
129. Ding and co-authors find that differences between the SIP data and private data feeds are 
sufficiently frequent to impose costs on active traders despite their brief average duration. See
Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence Hendershott, How Slow is the NBBO? A Comparison with 
Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 323 (2014) (“Although price dislocations have small 
effects on infrequently trading investors, investors that are continuously in the market can be sub-
stantially disadvantaged.”). A recent estimate is that HFTs earn approximately $5 billion per year 
globally from latency arbitrage of all types. See Aquilina, Budish & O’Neill, supra note 126, at 50.
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Any arbitrage at all between the SIP’s prices and those on the proprietary 
feeds is an artifact of regulatory design. It is also impossible to eliminate under 
the current regulatory framework, as data will always have to travel farther to 
go from an exchange to the SIP to a trader than directly from the exchange to 
the trader.
To the extent that Regulation NMS generates “too many” races from one 
venue to another, it also likely generates “too many” complex order types at 
those venues.130 In recent years, exchanges have introduced many new order 
types beyond the traditional market and limit orders. This, too, is not inherently 
surprising or problematic. As trading becomes automated, the discretionary de-
cisions that floor brokers once made have to be automated as well. New order 
types with multiple levels of conditionality can mimic a broker’s discretionary 
decisions whether and when to display, withdraw, or reprice an order.
New order types are also, however, the ultimate in colocation—they build 
parts of the HFTs’ algorithms into the logic of the matching engine itself. And 
like colocation and proprietary data feeds, the demand for complex order types 
is likely inflated by the proliferation of exchanges and the resulting multiplica-
tion of pathways from one venue to another.
Electronic trading also alters the ways in which large traders attempt to con-
ceal the size of their orders to reduce price impact. In a floor-based system, a 
large institutional purchaser could leave an order with a floor broker who would 
“work” the order, disclosing trading interest when the broker believed it could 
be done without moving prices significantly.131 Alternatively, the broker could 
contact a dealer in the “upstairs” market that might be willing to take the other 
side of the trade at an attractive price if it believed that the institution’s trade 
was not motivated by information.132
In an electronic environment, so-called dark liquidity takes the place of 
these strategies. Dark liquidity refers to trading methods that do not require that 
the institutional trader reveal its intentions to the rest of the market. It can in-
clude internalization by a dealer.133 In addition, exchanges typically allow non-
displayed orders, in other words, bids or offers that sit in the queue but are not 
included in the publicly-displayed data (and as a result typically have lower ex-
130. See Hester Peirce, Meeting Market Structure Challenges Where They Are, 43 J. CORP. L.
335, 356 (2018); see also PHIL MACKINTOSH, DEMYSTIFYING ORDER TYPES 3 (2014) (“Exchange 
fragmentation is a big part of the order complexity problem.”).
131. See Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 25; see also Yuk-Shee Chan & Mark Wein-
stein, Reputation, Bid-Ask Spread and Market Structure, 49 FIN. ANALYST J. 57, 60 (1993) (noting
that a floor broker uses reputation to signal to specialist that order is uninformed).
132. Another alternative would be “sunshine” trading, in which the large liquidity trader pre-
announces the direction and size of its trade as a means of signaling that it is uninformed. See Anat 
R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, SUNSHINE TRADING AND FINANCIAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, 4 REV.
FIN. STUD. 443, 444–47 (2015).
133. See Carole Comerton-Forde, Katya Malinova & Andreas Park, Regulating Dark Trad-
ing: Order Flow Segmentation and Market Quality, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 347–48 (2018) (describ-
ing dealer internalization).
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ecution priority than displayed orders).134 Finally, ATSs can and do choose not 
to display their quotes publicly, thereby foregoing trade-through protection.
They offer a means for investors not to reveal their intentions until they have 
found a counterparty.
Dark liquidity, like HFTs and complex order types, is not inherently objec-
tionable. It also, however, interacts in likely unintended ways with Regulation 
NMS. The OPR produces order routing that may not be in the trader’s best in-
terests.  A large trader may desire to bypass a venue if its best quote is for a 
small size in favor of a venue with a slightly worse price but a large displayed 
size as part of a strategy to minimize price impact. Trading on an exchange of-
fering a better price but a small size may tip the large trader’s hand.
Institutional buyers can partially alleviate the problem through an “inter-
market sweep order” (ISO).  An ISO permits a trader to buy (or sell) all the 
shares available at the NBBO while simultaneously buying (or selling) the 
shares available on one or more other exchanges at the best prices available on 
those exchanges, even though inferior to the NBBO.135 An exchange may exe-
cute an order marked as an ISO at its best price even though a better price is 
available on another exchange.
An ISO alleviates but does not solve the large trader’s problem. Only an 
exchange’s best-priced orders are protected for purposes of the OPR. By rule, 
an ISO executes only against protected orders.136 If the sizes of protected or-
ders are small in relation to the large trader’s needs, the large trader will want to 
execute against orders at an exchange’s second-best price, but those orders may 
disappear as soon as the ISO is entered. ISOs also impose substantial informa-
tional and compliance burdens on the executing broker, making them an expen-
sive means of working an order.
The OPR is therefore likely part of the reason for the proliferation of dark 
pools.137 Absent the OPR, it would be easier for large traders to use the “lit,” or 
publicly-displayed, markets without tipping their hands.  This, in turn, should 
result in more liquidity in the lit markets. While dark liquidity has always ex-
isted and would exist without the OPR, repeal of the OPR would likely lead to a 
shift in trading from dark to lit markets, potentially maintaining overall liquidity 
while enhancing displayed liquidity.138
134. Davies & Sirri, supra note 1, at 166–67.
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(31) (2020) (defining “intermarket sweep order”); see also id.
§§ 611(b)(5), (6) (establishing exemptions to Order Protection Rule for intermarket sweep orders 
and block trades executed simultaneously with intermarket sweep orders).
136. Id. § 242.600(b)(31)(ii) (noting that an ISO executes against a “protected” bid or offer).
137. See Marshall E. Blume, Competition and Fragmentation in the Equity Markets: The Ef-
fect of Regulation NMS 9 (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Rsch., Working Paper No. 02-07, 2007),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=959429.
138. See Comerton-Forde, Malinova & Park, supra note 133, at 349 (finding that a Canadian 
rule change requiring dark venues to offer price improvement enhanced lit liquidity and had a be-
nign effect on overall liquidity).
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HFTs, new order types, and dark liquidity are analogous to strategies or in-
stitutions that existed in the manual markets and have important roles to play in 
automated markets. This is not, however, to say that more is always better.
There is reason to suspect that Regulation NMS encourages more of each than 
is socially optimal.
C. Regulation NMS Discourages Innovation in Trading System Design
As of the mid-1990s, there was a clear distinction between Nasdaq’s quote-
driven dealer model and the NYSE’s order-driven auction model.139 In one, in-
vestors searched the quotes of competing market-makers and transacted with 
the one offering the best price. In the other, investors entered limit and market 
orders to a central auctioneer/dealer who matched orders or provided price im-
provement by trading for its own account.
This is no longer the case. All of the regulated exchanges now operate elec-
tronic limit order books that trade continuously.140 This would be unobjection-
able had the electronic continuous auction emerged as the winner in a competi-
tion among different trading systems. The convergence on a single model, 
however, is the consequence of exchanges’ need to operate within the con-
straints of existing market structure rules. As Harris puts it, “[t]he order han-
dling rules, unlisted trading privileges, Reg ATS, and Reg NMS all helped ho-
mogenize trading systems in the United States.”141
To take an example, Regulation NMS would make it difficult for an ex-
change to experiment with a periodic call auction during the trading day. Cur-
rent markets are continuous—as soon as a buy and a sell order can be matched, 
they are. Continuous markets rely on the willingness of immediacy providers—
market-makers in a prior era, HFTs currently—to trade against incoming market 
orders in return for a spread.
An alternative model is a call auction, in which trades do not execute con-
tinuously. Instead, orders are cumulated over time. Periodically, an auctioneer 
determines a market-clearing price and executes all trades that can be made at 
that price. A batch auction process is easily automated.
There are plausible (although not conclusive) arguments that batch auctions 
would be an improvement on continuous trading. For smaller, less liquid 
stocks, a low-frequency auction, perhaps every hour, could cumulate the trading 
interest of natural buyers and sellers over time and allow them to interact direct-
ly, rather than each trading with an intermediary. For larger stocks, high-
139. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 115–16 (2016), for a 
discussion of the difference.
140. See Application from Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Couns., Nasdaq to 
Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 13 (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-31/26531-3515735-162293.pdf (“Currently, all exchanges in 
the U.S. operate electronic limit order books.”).
141. Lawrence Harris, The Homogenization of U.S. Equity Trading 2 (Univ. S. Cal. Marshall 
Sch. Bus., Working Paper, 2011) (on file with author).
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frequency auctions, perhaps every few milliseconds, could reduce latency arbi-
trage and other advantages of speed while allowing near-instantaneous reflec-
tion of fundamental information.142
The OPR would substantially complicate auctions during the trading day.
The high-frequency call auction model involves a delay, albeit brief, between 
order entry and execution. Without regulatory relief, this would mean that the 
exchange running the auction would forfeit trade-through protection.143 Trans-
actions following a low-frequency call auction might themselves constitute ille-
gal trade-throughs if a better-priced order arrived at another market shortly be-
fore the auction. The relevant exchange would have to incorporate procedures 
to “clean up” any orders in other markets before executing trades at the auction 
price, complicating what would otherwise be a simple single-price auction.
The open of the NYSE and Nasdaq operates similarly to a call auction, cu-
mulating orders and executing them at a single opening price. The OPR con-
tains a specific exception for trade-throughs that occur at a single-priced trans-
action at the open of a trading center.144 Without obtaining similar regulatory 
relief, it would be a challenge to comply with the OPR while operating a period-
ic call auction. No U.S. exchanges currently operate auctions other than at the 
open or close.
ATSs are not subject to Regulation NMS and may change their trading pro-
cedures without SEC approval. There is more innovation in trading design 
among ATSs.145 Some, in fact, operate periodic auctions.  This suggests that 
regulatory constraints deter exchanges from innovating on trading design. They 
have little incentive to incur the regulatory costs involved because the exchang-
es capture part of the revenue generated by latency arbitrage through fees for 
proprietary data and colocation.146
The IEX introduced a modest innovation by incorporating a speed bump, or 
a 350-microsecond delay between order entry and execution, in order to reduce 
latency arbitrage.147 One might accordingly conclude that innovation remains 
possible within Regulation NMS’s constraints.  Alternatively, one might note 
that IEX’s modest innovation delayed and complicated its registration as an ex-
change. Other trading venues might conclude that they should operate as an 
ATS unless they are willing to operate identically to the existing exchanges.148
142. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 5.
143. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 243–44.
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(b)(3) (2020).
145. See Rauterberg, supra note 11 (manuscript at 15–16).
146. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 2 (“[I]ncumbent stock exchanges’ private in-
centives to innovate their market designs are misaligned with social interests because they earn 
economic rents from the arms race for speed.”) (italics in original).
147. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 270.
148. One popular market commentator argued that IEX’s speed bump is not a significant in-
novation, but rather a variant on the rebate strategies that other exchanges use to lure particular 
types of traders. See Kurt Dew, IEX One? IEX Two? The Speed Bump Must Go, SEEKING ALPHA
(June 14, 2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4081500-iex-one-iex-two-speed-bump-must-go 
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Absent competition based on different trading systems, exchanges compete 
for orders based on access fee structures. Exchanges charge fees to brokers 
who execute trades on their markets. The Access Rule caps those fees but does 
not keep an exchange from specifying which party (buyer, seller, passive, ac-
tive) pays the fee. Nor does it prevent an exchange from rebating a portion of 
the fee to one party or the other.
As a result, there are currently two dominant access fee models known as 
“maker-taker” and “taker-maker” (or “inverted”).149 In the first, the active par-
ty, meaning the one that initiates the trade via a marketable order, pays a fee.
This might be the regulated maximum of three-tenths of a cent per share, known 
in the business as 30 mils. The passive party, or the one that entered the resting 
limit order with which the incoming marketable order was paired, receives a re-
bate, perhaps 25 mils.  In an inverted model, the payments are reversed, with 
the passive party paying the fee and the active party receiving the rebate.
Once the innovation of a rebate was introduced, other exchanges followed 
suit in order to compete for limit orders. This, in turn, produced additional pric-
ing innovations. One is the tiering of rebates. Exchanges do not give all bro-
kers an identical rebate, but tailor rebates to trading volumes.  There is some 
indication that the tiers have proliferated to such an extent as to become, in ef-
fect, individually negotiated fee levels.150
The popularity of maker-taker pricing also created an incentive for some 
exchanges to switch to inverted pricing. Because the broker representing a limit 
order pays a fee for executions on an inverted exchange (and gives up the po-
tential rebate of a maker-taker exchange), it will post to inverted exchanges 
when it perceives that the probability of achieving an execution at a maker-taker 
exchange is low at the order’s current limit price. The broker or its customer in 
effect pays a fee of less than one cent rather than improve the limit price by a 
full cent. This is one of the deleterious effects of the current fragmented system 
for liquidity and price discovery, a point to which I will now turn.
(noting that to genuinely innovate, “IEX must do more than manipulate the NMS. It must confront 
and destroy the NMS.”).
149. See Carole Comerton-Forde, Vincent Grégoire & Zhuo Zhong, Inverted Fee Structures, 
Tick Size, and Market Quality, 134 J. FIN. ECON. 141, 141 (2019) (“The most common model is the 
make-take fee model . . . . More recently, three exchanges . . . have adopted an inverted fee mod-
el. . . .”).
150. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION 
REGARDING EXCHANGE REBATE TIER DISCLOSURE at 2 (2020).
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D. Compared to a Consolidated Market, Regulation NMS Discourages
Aggressive Orders
Shortly after the ITS went into effect, an SEC report concluded that it had 
not produced an improvement in bid-ask spreads.151 Indeed, a market consist-
ing of multiple venues operating identical trading systems can produce worse, 
and less informative, quoted prices than a single consolidated market. The rea-
son is that a consolidated market includes a primary (price) and secondary 
(time) priority rule.152 Among limit orders at the same price, the one that has 
been in the system longest is the first to execute.
Time priority creates two important incentives. First, it encourages traders 
to enter orders early rather than waiting to see what others are doing, thereby 
promoting price discovery. Second, it encourages them to bid up to (offer down 
to) their reservation prices. Once a trader puts a limit order into the queue, it 
cannot jump ahead of others except by improving its price. This incentive for 
vigorous competition among orders is a central benefit of consolidating trading 
on a single platform.
In the existing National Market System, nearly every stock trades on nearly 
every exchange. The OPR imposes a rule of cross-market price priority, but not 
time priority. As a result, the probability that a limit order will execute is weak-
ly related to the time at which it is entered. Relative to a price/time priority sys-
tem, the NMS system does not penalize traders for waiting to enter an order.
This encourages free riding on the information contained in other traders’ or-
ders.
A strategy called quote matching is an extreme form of free riding.153 Fast 
traders observe limit orders entered by slow traders and then trade on the same 
side of the market, recognizing that if prices move against the fast trader, it can 
simply sell to or buy from, as the case may be, the slow trader at the latter’s
original quote. Quote matching reduces the returns to investments in infor-
mation and thereby reduces the informativeness of prices.154
Traders in the current market do not have as strong an incentive to improve 
their prices when they find themselves at the back of a long queue as they
would in a consolidated market. If thirteen exchanges are trading a particular 
stock, and all happen to be quoting the same prices at a given moment in time, 
then there are thirteen queues of varying lengths. A broker representing an in-
coming market order would have no reason to prefer one exchange to the other 
(apart from fee structures). It might therefore make more sense for a limit order 
151. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERMARKET 
TRADING SYSTEM: 1978-1981, at 48–49 (1982); see also Ferrell, supra note 103, at 1063–66 (argu-
ing that a guarantee of execution at the NBBO is insufficient to induce aggressive pricing).
152. Other secondary priority rules (such as size priority) are possible, but I will ignore them 
for the sake of clarity.
153. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 248–50 (2003), for a description of quote matching.
154. See id. at 250–51.
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trader to search for the exchange at which it will be closest to the head of the 
line rather than to improve its price.
Alejandro Bernales et al. document precisely such behavior in a European 
market. They conclude that “Our results suggest that competition in market de-
sign, not fragmentation, drives previously documented improvements in market 
quality when new trading venues emerge; in the absence of such competition, 
market fragmentation is harmful.”155
This is a concrete respect in which Regulation NMS’s linked market is infe-
rior to an actually consolidated market. It is why the SEC initially proposed a 
central order file recognizing price and time priority.
In principle, the SEC could revise Regulation NMS to require a central or-
der file and impose both price and time priority.  This would be, in effect, a 
CLOB. A CLOB might or might not be a superior system to the existing one 
depending on the SEC’s ability to act as a public utility regulator. As discussed 
in more detail in the next subsection, this is not a simple matter.
Another theoretical solution would be to allow traders to quote in continu-
ous or nearly continuous, rather than discrete, pricing increments, thereby elim-
inating the advantage of being first in line at a given price.156 At present, the 
minimum tick size, or price increment, is one cent for most stocks. In principle, 
an exchange could allow price improvement in extremely small amounts, such 
as a billionth of a cent, to jump to the head of the line. Each trader could then 
be in a line by itself at a given price. Price/time priority would become price 
priority only.
This is not to advocate extremely small tick sizes, but simply to recognize 
that tick size and priority interact. In any event, Regulation NMS generally bars 
bids or offers priced in increments less than one cent.157
E. Regulation NMS Interferes with Brokers’ Efforts to Serve Their Customers’
Interests
Absent the OPR, we would expect brokers normally to route customer or-
ders to the venue offering the best price. While price is not the sole component 
of execution costs, it is a very important one. A broker will nearly always view 
price as the most important execution attribute for a small, uninformed order.
Large orders are more complicated because the cost of execution includes price 
impact as well as the bid-ask spread. Venues might compete for large orders 
155. Alejandro Bernales et al., A Tale of One Exchange and Two Order Books: Effects of 
Fragmentation in the Absence of Competition 1 (Sustainable Architecture for Fin. in Eur., Working 
Paper No. 234, 2018).
156. See Chen Yao & Mao Ye, Why Trading Speed Matters: A Tale of Queue Rationing un-
der Price Controls, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 2157, 2157–58 (2018) (discussing interaction between tick 
size and time priority).
157. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.612(a) (2020). Nevertheless, fee rebates create an effective system 
of half-penny pricing. See Yao & Ye, supra note 156, at 2163 n.6 (discussing the prevalence of 
prices being listed at fractions of a cent as result of rebates).
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with a structure that permits traders to hide order size until they have found 
counterparties willing to trade.158 A broker handling a large order might choose 
to route a large order there while bypassing a market offering a slightly better 
price but a small displayed size.
The OPR, however, results in orders being first routed to the market dis-
playing the best price even if this does not minimize execution cost, all things 
considered. The purpose of the rule, therefore, is not to protect the broker’s 
customer but to protect traders who enter limit orders. In effect, the rule impos-
es a universal duty to “reward” traders who enter the best-priced limit orders.159
It thereby interferes with a broker’s desire to route orders based on its own cus-
tomers’ best interests.
F. Regulation NMS Makes the SEC a Public Utility Regulator, a Task for 
Which it is Poorly Suited
Under current practices, brokers pay exchanges for access to data and for 
executing trades.  In both instances, Regulation NMS has at best failed to in-
crease the competitiveness of prices and may have reduced it. As a conse-
quence, the SEC has become a public utility regulator, overseeing the prices of 
both services.
1.  Data Fees
As previously noted, exchanges must provide the SIP with their top of book 
quotations and last transaction prices, also known as “core” data. The Securi-
ties Acts Amendments allow the SEC to recognize either an exclusive proces-
sor/seller or multiple processors/sellers of the SIP’s core data. It also gives the 
SEC regulatory authority to regulate the fees of any exclusive information pro-
cessor to ensure that they are fair and reasonable.160 From the creation of the 
consolidated quotation system to date, the SEC has chosen an exclusive proces-
sor model and therefore regulates fees for core data. Because each exchange is 
the exclusive provider of its proprietary data, the SEC also has the authority to 
regulate those prices.
The SEC is not well-suited to be a public utility rate regulator. Its original 
mandate was to protect investors by improving corporate disclosure practices 
158. See Harris, supra note 107, at 276 (“Large traders therefore prefer market structures that 
allow them to find parties willing to trade while minimizing the information that they must expose 
to find these parties.”).
159. See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Orders to Markets, 28 REGUL. 62, 68
(2005) (“[T]he SEC has reinterpreted the duty of best execution as a general duty to the markets, 
rather than as a particularized contractual obligation”).
160. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-1(b) (exclusive processor registration requirement), 78k-1(c) 
(grant of rulemaking authority) (2018).
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and deterring fraud and manipulation.161 Its organization and staffing reflect 
that mandate. The agency is dominated by lawyers; each of the four current 
Commissioners and the nominee for the fifth seat (as of July 2020) is a law-
yer.162 The economists on its staff have traditionally been experts in finance, 
not industrial organization.
The SEC’s performance as a rate regulator has been unimpressive. Initially, 
it simply accepted core data fees negotiated between the exchanges through 
their captive Plans, on the one hand, and groups representing broker-dealers and 
institutional investors, on the other.163 Only under sustained pressure from the 
D.C. Circuit did the SEC reluctantly begin to question fee levels.
In 1999, as part of a concept release seeking comment on its review process 
for core data fees, the SEC justified its light-touch stance.164 Congress had not 
intended to turn the SEC into a “ratemaking” agency, the release argued, but 
instead allowed it to adopt a “more flexible approach than ratemaking.”165 The 
Commission’s primary objective was not cost-based pricing but
(1) the wide availability of market information, (2) the neutrality of fees among 
markets, vendors, broker-dealers, and users, (3) the quality of market infor-
mation—its integrity, reliability, and accuracy, and (4) fair competition and equal 
regulation among markets and broker-dealers . . . . [t]he Commission has relied to a 
great extent on the ability of the SROs and Plans to negotiate fee levels that are ac-
ceptable to SRO members, information vendors, investors, and other interested par-
ties.
166
The SEC took the same approach to proprietary data. Initially, exchanges 
did not charge for proprietary data. Its primary value was to give large traders 
“depth of book” information, or information about the prices and sizes of quota-
tions inferior to the current NBBO. The rise of HFTs, however, increased the 
demand for speed. The exchanges, therefore, began charging for proprietary 
data, which reaches subscribers more rapidly than the SIP’s data.167
In 2008, the SEC approved an NYSE Arca rule change imposing a fee for 
proprietary data. Consistent with its stance on core data, the SEC declined to 
review the amount of the fee, concluding that competition for orders among 
161. In addition to its investor protection mandate, Congress more recently instructed the SEC 
to “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018).
162. See Davies & Sirri, supra note 1, at 148 (“[F]or the most part the SEC tries to stay away 
from price regulation.”); see also id. at 150 (“[T]he SEC is a consummately legal body.”).
163. See, e.g., In re Bunker Ramo Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 15,372, 16 SEC Docket 
285 (Nov. 29, 1978) (approving fees by Options Price Reporting Authority for access to SIAC 
transactions data for exchange-traded options).
164. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, supra note 13, at 70,629–30.
165. Id. at 70,619 (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 70,622.
167. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, at 
8–9 (October 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2018/34-84432.pdf [hereinafter 
SIFMA Application].
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trading venues would hold data fees to a reasonable level.168 The Securities In-
dustry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and a coalition of internet 
firms challenged the SEC’s approval.
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that, while the SEC could consider competi-
tion among trading venues as a factor in determining whether fees are fair and 
reasonable, the record did not include evidence sufficient to sustain the SEC’s 
decision.169 The court faulted the SEC’s failure to consider issues that would 
typically come into play in an antitrust case, such as market definition and de-
mand elasticity.170 The failure was hardly surprising, as these concepts were 
not part of the SEC’s regulatory vocabulary and equity market structure was not 
part of the traditional concern of antitrust scholars.
After additional procedural skirmishing resulting from Dodd-Frank Act 
amendments to the procedures for SRO rule filings, SIFMA’s challenge to the 
NYSE Arca fees returned to the SEC, which consolidated it with a similar chal-
lenge to Nasdaq’s proprietary data fees.  In 2016, an SEC administrative law 
judge ruled in favor of the exchanges, concluding that broker-dealers’ ability to 
direct orders to the exchange of their choice (within the OPR’s constraints) gave 
them sufficient bargaining leverage to keep the exchanges from charging a mo-
nopoly price for proprietary data.171
Meanwhile, the SEC had suffered another D.C. Circuit loss in a fee case, 
this one involving the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC).172 The court con-
cluded that by deferring to the OCC’s view of the reasonableness of its alloca-
tion of costs between its members and nonmembers, the SEC “abdicated [its] 
responsibility.”173
Facing the prospect of continuous litigation over data fee approvals, the 
SEC abandoned its light-touch stance. It reversed its administrative law judge’s 
decision in favor of NYSE Arca and Nasdaq, concluding that the exchanges had 
failed adequately to justify the fee level.174 It similarly ruled against the OCC, 
concluding that it had failed to present sufficient evidence supporting its rule 
changes.175
168. Id. at 1.
169. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 537–544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (remanding to SEC 
for further proceedings).
170. See id. at 542–43 (noting that the availability of substitutes insufficient to demonstrate 
competitiveness absent evidence of interchangeability and prices of substitutes and elasticity of de-
mand).
171. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Initial Decision Release No. 1015, at 
31 (June 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2016/id1015bpm.pdf.
172. See generally Susquehanna Int’l Grp. v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
173. Id. at 446.
174. SIFMA Application, supra note 167, at 28.
175. See generally Order Disapproving Proposed Rule Change Concerning the Options Clear-
ing Corporation’s Capital Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 85,121 (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/occ/2019/34-85121.pdf.
34 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 10:1
The SEC subsequently engaged in a burst of activity with respect both to 
core and proprietary data fees. In May 2019, its staff issued guidance on fee 
filings.176 The guidance makes clear that in the future, exchanges will have to 
provide detailed evidence to justify increases in their fees for proprietary data.
In general, that evidence will consist either of an antitrust-style analysis of the 
relevant market sufficient to demonstrate competitive pricing or a public utility 
ratemaking-style analysis of the costs of providing the service. Preliminary data 
suggest that exchanges will have a difficult time mustering evidence that the 
demand for their data is highly elastic.177 If so, the exchanges will have to
demonstrate their fixed and marginal costs of providing data and argue about 
what is a reasonable rate of return.
With respect to core data, the SEC recently abandoned its longstanding 
preference for exclusive provision of the SIP’s data, proposing instead a system 
of multiple, competing data vendors in hopes that this will reduce the Plans’
pricing power.178 At the same time, it proposed to expand the definition of core 
data to include some of what is now proprietary data. Should the SEC adopt the 
proposal, exchanges will have to provide this expanded core data to the compet-
ing data vendors for dissemination and sale. As of July 2020, the SEC has not 
yet adopted the proposal.
The provision for decentralized, competing data providers is an important 
step toward competitive pricing. Collectivizing even more of the exchanges’
data, however, risks making the exchanges less interested in the quality and in-
tegrity of that data, which could hamper price discovery.179
Most recently, the SEC has ordered the exchanges to submit a revised, con-
solidated Equity Data Plan to replace the three current Plans.180 Importantly, 
the new Plan will no longer be governed exclusively by the exchanges but will 
include broker-dealer and institutional investor representatives, among others.
The governance rules will also be revised so that groups of exchanges, such as 
CBOE, Nasdaq, and NYSE, will receive a single vote rather than one for each 
separate exchange within the group. The unstated but obvious objective is to 
produce core data fees that will be less subject to judicial challenge.
176. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF GUIDANCE ON SRO RULE FILINGS RELATING TO 
FEES (2019), https://www.sec.gov/tm/staff-guidance-sro-rule-filings-fees.
177. See Ike Brennan, Are Stock Market Data Fees Higher than the Law Allows?, FORBES 
(Sept. 26, 2019, 2:40PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2019/09/26/are-stock-market-
data-fees-higher-than-the-law-allows/.
178. See Market Data Infrastructure, supra note 9.
179. See Supriya Sarnikar & D. Bruce Johnsen, Cybersecurity in the National Market System,
6 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2009) (raising this concern with respect to the collectivization of data 
generally).
180. See Order Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to 
Submit a New National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data, Ex-
change Act Release No. 88,827, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,702 (May 13, 2020). The three current Plans cover 
last-sale data, quotation data, and data regarding Nasdaq stocks traded on exchanges. See id. at 
28,703.
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2.  Access Fees
Exchanges individually determine prices for executing trades. The OPR, 
however, removes one critical driver of competition, which is consumer choice.
In a normal competitive market, a consumer can decide whether it is cheaper, 
all things considered, to pay a fee to join a membership-only wholesale club 
like Costco or shop at a grocery store that does not require a membership but 
charges slightly higher prices.
A broker’s choice of trading venue, by contrast, is constrained. The OPR 
provides that Exchange B may not execute a trade if Exchange A is displaying a 
better price for that stock at that time. Even if the broker representing a market 
order would prefer to trade on Exchange B, it cannot do so unless and until Ex-
change A is no longer displaying a better price. In practical terms, then, a bro-
ker wishing to transact immediately in that situation must send the order to Ex-
change A and incur whatever fee it charges for execution.
This constraint on broker choice gives each exchange more pricing power 
than it would otherwise have. The SEC has again had to step in as a price regu-
lator. The Access Rule requires that exchanges not unfairly discriminate among 
traders in granting direct or indirect access to the market.181 As noted above, it 
also caps access fees at $0.003 per share.
That cap appears to be comfortably above the market price of execution 
services.182 The SEC may therefore have assumed that competition among 
venues would hold fees below the cap and the SEC could declare its mission 
accomplished. However, the exchanges took the Access Rule as a license to 
move to a nominal fee of $0.003 and then rebate most of that fee through a 
maker-taker or inverted fee model.
The SEC accordingly faced criticism for facilitating these fee models.183
The rebates create new conflicts of interest between customers and their bro-
kers, who typically retain the rebate. Specifically, they create incentives for 
brokers to route customer limit orders to the market that offers the highest re-
bate rather than the one that offers the highest probability of execution.
In response to these criticisms, the SEC announced in 2018 that it would run 
an experiment with alternative fee structures known as the Access Fee Pilot.
The Access Fee Pilot would temporarily impose varying caps on access fees 
and rebates on different traded stocks to assess the effects on market quality and 
liquidity.184
181. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a) (2020).
182. Budish et al. conclude that the net fee paid for trade execution averages about $0.0002 
per share, or less than a tenth of the regulatory cap. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 4.
183. See, e.g., Robert Battalio, Shane A. Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It
All? On the Relation between Make-Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality, 71 J. FIN. 2193, 
2196 (2016) (finding a “negative relation between take fees and limit order execution quality”); An-
gel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 39 (“Make-or-take pricing has significantly distorted trading in 
the National Market System.”).
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610T (2020).
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The NYSE, Nasdaq, and CBOE promptly sued the SEC on the grounds that 
its approval of the Access Fee Pilot was arbitrary and capricious.185 The D.C. 
Circuit ruled in June 2020 that the agency lacks the statutory authority to adopt 
the Access Fee Pilot.186
Commentators have noticed the increasing willingness of regulated entities 
to sue the SEC. As the Wall Street Journal put it, “suing a company’s regula-
tor—an uncommon and aggressive tactic—is becoming less taboo as the SEC 
tries to flex its muscles.”187 A more accurate way to put the point might be that 
lawsuits are becoming less taboo now that the SEC can substantially enhance or 
diminish the pricing power of regulated entities, creating potentially dramatic 
distributional effects.188 The SEC is responding with changes to Regulation 
NMS in hopes that procedural fixes can produce more competitive prices. I
propose below that a more fundamental rethinking is needed.
G. So What?
An obvious response to these concerns is that on objective measures, U.S. 
equity markets serve investors better today than at any time in the past.189 Why 
should the SEC change a system that performs its essential functions at such a
low cost?
There is scant evidence that the core of Regulation NMS—the separate-but-
linked trading environment and supporting features such as the OPR—has 
much, if anything, to do with the secular improvements in the functioning of 
U.S. equity markets. Instead, those improvements are largely due to exogenous 
developments and other regulatory changes.
The fall in retail brokerage commissions cannot be a consequence of Regu-
lation NMS because it is a decades-long phenomenon.190 Congress’s and the 
SEC’s decisions to end the fixed commission system in the 1970s, which was 
185. See Petition for Review at 2, N.Y. Stock Exch. v. SEC, No. 19-1042 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 
2019).
186. See N.Y. Stock Exch. v. SEC, 962 F.3d 541, 546 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
187. Cezary Podkul, Proxy Advisory Firm Sues SEC Over New Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 
2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisory-firm-sues-sec-over-new-rules-
11572600608.
188. The SEC action described in the Wall Street Journal article cited above is an example. 
See id. In 2004, the SEC’s staff issued guidance permitting investment advisors to meet their fiduci-
ary obligations by voting shares in conformance with recommendations by third party advisors re-
gardless of certain conflicts of interest to which the advisors were subject. At present, there is a
powerful duopoly of proxy advisory firms. The SEC became concerned that these firms were exer-
cising excessive power and walked back its prior guidance. See SEC 17 C.F.R. § 271, 276 (2016). It 
simultaneously interpreted proxy advisor recommendations as “solicitations” under the proxy rules. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 241 (2016). The latter interpretation, in particular, threatened the power of the advi-
sory firm duopoly, resulting in the lawsuit.
189. See Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that “[v]irtually every measurable 
dimension of US equity market quality has improved” since the beginning of the century).
190. See id. at 16 fig.14 (showing a decrease in retail brokerage commissions).
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itself prompted by the rise of institutional investors, initiated a long secular de-
cline in retail brokerage commissions.
Similarly, the fall in bid-ask spreads followed changes in tick size, not the 
OPR or other commands to the exchanges to more effectively link the markets.
Effective bid-ask spreads fell in two discrete steps as the minimum tick size fell, 
first from eighths to sixteenths, then from sixteenths to decimals.191 The largest 
drop occurred after the completion of the move to decimalization (that is, mak-
ing the minimum pricing increment for most stocks one cent) in 2001.192 It is 
also notable that bid-ask spreads for the stocks of small-capitalization compa-
nies have not improved in line with those of large-cap companies.193 This is a 
small piece of evidence for the proposition that Regulation NMS’s one-size-fits-
all model may not fit small-cap stocks very well.
The entry of new exchanges in Europe in the mid-2000s was associated 
with a prompt improvement in market quality and reductions in trading costs.194
At that time, Europe’s regulatory system was transitioning from the Investment 
Services Directive of the mid-1990s to the Markets in Financial Instruments Di-
rective.195 It is unlikely that regulatory commands which were not yet effective, 
and certainly not commands to link markets, were responsible for the rise of 
competition. Technology and innovation are the more likely causes.196
In short, there is ample reason to believe that the SEC could replace Regula-
tion NMS with a simpler system without adverse effects on commissions, bid-
ask spreads, or other measures of market quality. Certain regulatory changes—
ending fixed commissions, rejecting limits on off-exchange trading, and moving 
to decimal pricing—reduced investors’ costs. Replacing the heavy hand of 
Regulation NMS with a lighter and simpler set of principles would not undo 
those changes.
191. See Tarun Chordia, Richard Roll & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Liquidity and Market 
Efficiency, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 249, 256 (2008) (noting that effective spreads “experienced three dis-
tinct regimes corresponding to subperiods for the eighth, sixteenth, and decimal minimum tick siz-
es”).
192. The SEC in 2000 required the exchanges and Nasdaq to submit plans to price securities 
in decimal increments, with all listed securities priced in decimals by April 9, 2001. See Order Di-
recting the Exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Submit a Phase-in 
Plan to Implement Decimal Pricing in Equity Securities and Options, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,914, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,010, 38,013 (June 19, 2000).
193. See Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 10 (“The downward trend in spreads, which 
is so visible for the larger stocks, has not been as uniform for smaller stocks.”).
194. Menkveld, supra note 119, at 338–39.
195. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive was adopted in 2004 with a 2-year tran-
sition period. See Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
196. See Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J.
FIN. MKTS. 712, 717 (2013) (“Instinet pre-empted MIFID when it launched Chi-X . . .”).
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IV. MOVING FORWARD
The time has come for a fundamental rethinking of equity market structure 
regulation. The SEC should repeal Regulation NMS and replace it with a less 
prescriptive and less intrusive set of design principles. Those design principles 
should include issuer choice, exchange autonomy, and regulatory consistency.
A. Issuer Choice
The SEC can and should require that an exchange receive the issuer’s con-
sent before it offers trading in a stock. As matters now stand, any exchange that 
wishes to trade a security may do so by extending unlisted trading privileges 
(UTP) to that security.197 In practice, nearly every exchange trades nearly every 
listed stock.198 This system reflects Congress’s and the SEC’s policy judgment 
that giving exchanges broad authority to trade stocks listed on other exchanges 
would foster competition and thereby reduce investors’ trading costs.199
The problem with the policy stance is that we do not know whether dispers-
ing trading among competing markets or consolidating it on a single market 
maximizes liquidity.200 The current system assumes that regulators are best 
placed to make that determination.201 A better system would recognize that is-
suers are in a superior position.  Although managers of public companies are 
subject to their own agency problems, they still have stronger incentives than 
exchanges, broker-dealers, or the SEC to maximize liquidity for their stock.202
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(f) (2018) (noting that “any national securities exchange may . . . extend 
unlisted trading privileges to . . . any security that is listed on a national securities exchange” subject 
to certain exceptions).
198. Application from Edward Knight, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Couns., Nasdaq, Inc., 
to Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 25, 2018) (on file with the Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n).
199. See, e.g., Unlisted Trading Privileges, Hearing on H.R. 4535 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Telecomm. and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 3, (1994) (statement of 
Rep. Fields) (noting that the bill would remove “outdated restrictions” “to ensure that monopolies 
are not being protected and that competition, not regulation, determines where stocks will trade.”); 
id. at 38 (testimony of Brandon Becker, Director, SEC Market Regulation Division) (suggesting 
that, by streamlining approval process for UTP, the bill would “enhance[e] the opportunity for com-
petition among markets”).
200. See Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 3, at 200–01.
201. See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice 
in Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 605 (2005) (the SEC “has taken a dim view of 
issuers’ efforts to restrict the trading venue of their securities, once those securities have been 
listed”). Macey and O’Hara argue that issuers could use share transfer restrictions to consolidate 
trading on a single venue at the time of an IPO.
202. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded it Congressional Man-
date to Facilitate a “National Market System” in Securities Trading?, 1 NYU J. L. & BUS. 613, 653 
n.165 (2005) (noting that issuers might choose trading venues in their personal interests rather than 
in shareholder interests). While this is undoubtedly correct, it is not a complete answer to whether 
issuers should be allowed to select a venue. Exchanges are subject to competitive forces, but so are 
managers (in the labor and capital markets).
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The choice between (relatively) consolidated or dispersed trading is likely 
unimportant for the largest and most heavily-traded stocks. They are popular 
trading and investment vehicles, meaning that their liquidity is mostly exoge-
nously determined and relatively insensitive to the structure of the market(s) on 
which they trade.
There is a debate about whether the liquidity of smaller and more thinly-
traded stocks is also mostly exogenously determined or whether consolidating 
their trading on a smaller number of venues could enhance liquidity.203 Some 
market professionals argue that small-company stocks that trade on many ven-
ues are less liquid than those trading on fewer venues.204 There is empirical ev-
idence that dispersed trading has a positive effect on liquidity for large stocks 
but a negative effect for small stocks.205
Fortunately, it would be a simple matter to permit issuers to experiment 
with different levels of consolidated or dispersed trading. The SEC has the 
statutory authority to require issuer consent as a condition of extending UTP for 
a given stock.206 The SEC could also require issuer consent as a condition of 
trading on ATSs since the statutory provisions governing UTP do not apply to 
ATSs.
Dealer internalization is not currently regulated as either an exchange or an 
ATS, so limiting trading to a single exchange would not prevent it. On the oth-
er hand, should a smaller issuer choose to have its shares traded on only one ex-
change, dealers might find it preferable to expose their buying or selling interest 
to that exchange rather than trying to trade alongside it. In short, the starting 
assumption should be that internalization will not adversely affect liquidity.
Should that assumption prove incorrect, the SEC can address it at a later date.
The latter point is of more general applicability. My arguments throughout 
are premised on the notion that technology has made the market for trading plat-
forms more competitive than it was when Congress instructed the SEC to create 
a national market system in 1975. Should the SEC observe specific non-
203. See Davies & Sirri, supra note 1, at 159 (“Market fragmentation may be a greater con-
cern for small capitalization issuers . . . .”).
204. On April 23, 2018, the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets held a roundtable on 
market structure for thinly traded securities. See generally Sec. Exch. Comm’n. Division of Trading 
and Markets: Roundtable On Market Structure For Thinly-Traded Securities (April 23, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure-roundtables/thinly-traded-securities-
rountable-042318-transcript.txt. Several participants expressed the view that suspension of UTP 
might enhance liquidity for thinly traded stocks. See id. at 73, 97, 113, 233, 235.
205. See Peter Haslag & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, The demise of the NYSE and NASDAQ:
Market Quality in the Age of Market Fragmentation 2 (Working Paper, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591715 (“Our findings present new evidence that the reduced transaction 
cost effect [of fragmentation] dominates for medium and large-capitalization stocks, leading to im-
provements in market quality, while the negative network externality effect dominates in small-
capitalization stocks, leading to a reduction in trading and market quality.”).
206. Although Section 12(f) of the Exchange Act empowers any exchange to extend UTP to 
any listed security, the SEC has the authority to impose “additional procedures or requirements” for 
extending UTP. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(f)(1)(D) (2018).
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competitive practices in the simpler system I outline, it has ample authority to 
introduce tailored solutions. It need not, however, retain an entire system ini-
tially designed to break down the NYSE’s walled garden of fixed commissions, 
off-exchange trading restrictions, and limited access.
B. Exchange Autonomy
The National Market System requires exchanges to act against their own in-
terests and sometimes those of brokers and traders in pursuit of the SEC’s goal 
of combining the best of competitive and consolidated market structures. Ex-
changes must maintain an order-routing system, a consolidated tape, and a con-
solidated quotation system that they did not create for their own purposes and 
that generate the various problems outlined in Section III.
The entire system should be replaced by one that gives exchanges, and by 
extension brokers and traders, the autonomy to select their strategies and suc-
ceed or fail accordingly. An exchange should be free to select the trading rules 
and terms of access that it thinks will attract orders from traders and their agen-
cy brokers, who in return should be free to trade or not trade on that exchange.
The OPR, Access Rule, and related rules are unnecessary to ensure that 
brokers can and will search for the best price. To the extent the OPR was in-
tended as a backstop to the broker’s duty of best execution, it is expensive over-
kill. The SEC should offer additional guidance on best execution or step up its 
enforcement against brokers if it believes they are intentionally failing to seek 
superior executions for customers.
The OPR’s other objective—to reward the limit order trader offering the 
best price—sometimes conflicts with the objective of best execution. The SEC 
should concede that its attempt to force market participants to act against self-
interest to pursue an abstract notion of fairness to limit order traders is costly 
and does not achieve its objective of encouraging those traders to quote aggres-
sively.
Because of the significant positive externalities associated with transaction 
data, exchanges should be required to publish that data in real time (although 
possibly with a delay for data on transaction size to encourage large traders to 
trade in lit markets).207 Given current communications technologies, there is no 
need for a central processor to consolidate these. Brokers can get feeds directly 
from exchanges and create their own consolidated tape.
Exchanges should, however, be able to set the terms of access to their quo-
tations rather than selling them collectively through one or more Equity Data 
Plans. One might argue in opposition to that idea that the market’s experience 
with proprietary data feeds shows that giving exchanges the right to determine 
fees is a bad idea. Current proprietary data fees are high enough to induce bro-
kers to mount legal challenges. The reason may have to do with network ef-
207. See Larry Harris, What to Do about High-Frequency Trading, 69 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 6, 7 
(2013).
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fects. Quotation data from different exchanges are complements, meaning that 
a broker buying data from one exchange has an incentive to buy from all the 
others.208 Competition among exchanges for orders may therefore not ensure 
competitive pricing for data.209
Another possibility, however, is that private data feeds are expensive pri-
marily because they are a “speed technology” that facilitates latency arbi-
trage.210 Eric Budish and co-authors offer a model with homogeneous exchang-
es and fixed entry costs and identify a possible equilibrium in which exchanges 
share rents with HFTs by charging high prices for data and colocation. Empiri-
cally, they estimate that exchanges capture about 30% of rents through data 
fees.211 If Budish et al. are correct, then eliminating Regulation NMS would be 
the sort of regulatory “push” that could spur innovation and eliminate the 
rents.212
Moreover, in a system that gives issuers a choice of trading venues, compe-
tition for listings may reduce data fees. Given the right to choose where its 
shares will trade, an issuer would have an incentive to insist on low data fees.
Lower costs will mean more brokers connecting to the exchange and therefore, 
at the margin, more orders submitted and greater liquidity.
Even if the system I outline does not produce competitive data fees, brokers 
and their customers will be no worse off than they are now. The SEC currently 
regulates prices for both core and proprietary data. In a world without Regula-
tion NMS and automatic UTP, it might still have to do so—but it might not. In 
either event, giving exchanges more control over their quotation data will give 
them stronger incentives to maximize data quality and integrity.213
C. Regulatory Consistency
At the time of the 1975 amendments, exchanges were closed, member-
owned organizations whose rules governed not merely the mechanics of trading 
but the business conduct of their member brokers and the corporate governance 
and disclosure practices of their listed companies. Since that time, exchanges 
have demutualized and offloaded most of their role as broker-dealer regulators 
to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Specialists and mar-
ket makers have been largely replaced by HFTs that do not undertake formal 
obligations to the exchanges to maintain a continuous market. Meanwhile, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act usurped the few remaining areas 
208. Lawrence R. Glosten, Economics of the Stock Exchange Business: Proprietary Market 
Data 3–8 (Working Paper, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533525.
209. Id. at 2.
210. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 2.
211. Id. at 3–4.
212. See id. at 6–7.
213. See generally Sarnikar & Johnson, supra note 179.
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in which exchanges had regulated the corporate governance practices of listed 
companies.214
There is no longer a good reason to insist that exchanges be SROs.215
FINRA and the SEC can and should absorb their remaining regulatory role.
Necessarily, then, there is no longer a need for trading platforms offering ser-
vices that are close substitutes to be subject to different regulatory regimes. The 
lighter-touch approach of Regulation ATS could be extended to all trading plat-
forms.
Trading platforms may currently choose to register as an exchange or regis-
ter as a broker-dealer and operate as an ATS.  ATSs, unlike exchanges, may 
maintain control over the quotations in their systems. They need not submit 
their rules for the SEC’s approval.  The SEC should eliminate the distinction 
and adopt a simplified and unified regulatory system for all multiple-to-multiple 
trading markets, meaning any market that allows multiple buyers to negotiate 
with multiple sellers and that executes the resulting trades.216 The markets 
should have broad authority to determine their trading environments and associ-
ated rules without SEC approval.
A side benefit of the system I’ve described is that, by removing SRO status 
from exchanges, the SEC could make clear that their business practices are sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny on the same basis as any other business. The SEC 
might identify certain practices, such as any exchange rule or procedure that at-
tempts to prevent or penalize a subscriber from routing an order to another mar-
ket on which the stock is traded, as anticompetitive.  Similarly, any collusion 
among exchanges in setting fees or other terms would be banned—unlike the
current system, of which collusion through the Plans is an integral part.
D. Can We Get There from Here?
Regulation NMS likely contributed to the proliferation of trading venues 
and gave exchanges more pricing power. Its replacement might reverse these
trends. Some trading venues would see themselves as potential losers in a dif-
ferent competitive environment and would resist change.217 They would argue 
214. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2018) (noting that the SEC shall direct SROs to require 
independent audit committees); id. § 78j-3 (noting that the SEC shall direct SROs to require inde-
pendent compensation committee); id. § 78j-4 (noting that the SEC shall direct SROs to require re-
covery of erroneously awarded incentive-based executive compensation). See also id. §§ 7241–7266 
(including officer attestation of financial reports, forfeiture of CEO and CFO incentive compensa-
tion in event of accounting restatement, management assessment of internal controls, code of ethics 
for senior financial officers).
215. Cf. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 201, at 591–93 (drawing a similar conclusion).
216. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2020) (defining an “exchange” as a multiple-to-multiple 
facility).
217. See Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 3, at 201 (“[A]ny attempt to reverse the deci-
sion for multiple venues would meet stiff resistance from those who have built businesses based on 
an assumption that the multivenue structure will continue.”).
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that Regulation NMS helped create the markets’ current blend of low costs and 
high liquidity and its replacement would harm investors. While, as noted 
above, I believe the evidence does not support that argument, it might reinforce 
regulators’ natural tendency to move slowly.218
On the other hand, as the SEC is discovering, even incremental changes that 
interfere with exchanges’ pricing power generate massive pushback. Within a 
month of the SEC’s order to the exchanges to revamp the Equity Data Plans, the 
Nasdaq family of exchanges petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.219 Perhaps 
more fundamental change would be no more painful in the long run.
There are signs that the SEC is willing to consider more than small, incre-
mental changes to Regulation NMS.  Commissioner Hester Peirce has argued 
that “as we progress with further market structure reforms, we should be willing 
to consider eliminating rules that interfere with—or even foreclose—efficient 
methods of communication or market interactions rather than imposing addi-
tional rules that merely mitigate the effects of prior regulatory choices.”220 The 
SEC has held multiple roundtable discussions on market structure topics in 
which industry and academic participants have discussed potential reforms.221
The SEC could travel a significant distance with one straightforward rule-
making. It could act on my suggestion above and adopt a rule requiring issuer 
consent before an exchange extends UTP to a stock. The Treasury Department 
has recommended that the SEC consider permitting UTP suspension for small-
company stocks.222 Extending an issuer consent principle to all stocks would 
not go much farther, since large companies would likely grant consent routine-
ly. As part of the same rulemaking, the SEC could amend Regulation ATS to 
require issuer consent before an ATS trades a stock. The rule should also en-
sure that exchanges do not impose unreasonable burdens preventing an issuer 
from changing its listing or UTP status as its needs change.
The next priority should be to repeal the OPR. Several of the unintended 
consequences of Regulation NMS described in Part III above stem from the 
OPR. Its repeal would facilitate competition in market structure as opposed to 
the current system in which largely identical markets compete for order flow 
through complicated pricing structures.
Without the OPR and its resulting mandatory order routing, exchanges 
could not attract orders without reasonable fees and other terms of access.
There should accordingly be no more need for the Access Rule’s provisions on 
218. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 7 (noting “the incrementalism that invariably leads regu-
lators to attempt to solve every problem, however small, in a vacuum.”).
219. See Exchange Act Release No. 89,066, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,921 (June 18, 2020) (denying 
stay pending legislation).
220. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks before the SIFMA 
Equity Market Structure Conference (April 18, 2018).
221. See Equity Market Structure Roundtables, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure-roundtables (last modified Oct. 17, 2019).
222. See Mnuchin & Phillips, supra note 7, at 60.
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fees. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the SEC could continue to re-
quire nondiscriminatory access.
The next step would be more disruptive to the current system. That would 
be to replace the NMS Plan(s) with a rule simply requiring real-time public ac-
cess to last-transaction data. The exchanges would then gain control over their 
quotation data. Perhaps this would get the SEC out of the business of regulating 
prices. Even if it doesn’t, the SEC would simply have to continue its current 
oversight of the prices of proprietary data feeds.
At that point, the SEC would have instituted issuer choice and exchange au-
tonomy. The remaining task would be to free exchanges from their role as 
SROs and give them similar regulatory treatment to ATSs. Issuer and broker 
choices, not regulatory mandates, would determine which trading venues and 
systems will survive.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC has disclaimed a desire to dictate the way in which exchanges 
trade stocks or the fees they charge for their services. By a series of gradual 
steps, however, the SEC finds itself doing both.
Increasingly, the SEC’s incremental changes to its market structure regula-
tions address shortcomings of prior regulatory changes. The SEC could contin-
ue down the same path. It could reduce the maximum fee for execution access, 
require broker-dealers to pass rebates along to their customers, introduce more 
competition into the Equity Data Plan(s), and require exchanges to provide their 
proprietary data to the SIP. These changes would respond to some of the most 
visible unintended consequences of Regulation NMS.
Alternatively, the SEC could step back and ask whether a system that re-
quires such constant recalibration is a good system. I have argued that it is not.
It could and should be replaced with a simple set of principles—issuer choice, 
exchange autonomy, and regulatory consistency. These will allow exchanges to 
innovate, brokers to focus on their customers’ interests, and issuers to pursue 
stock price maximization through liquidity maximization.
